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INTRODUCTION:
During World War II, U.S. military forces pursued policies based in large part on the
Rainbow Five war plan. Louis Morton argued in Strategy and Command: The First Two Years
that “The early war plans were little more than abstract exercises and bore little relation to actual
events.”1 However, this thesis will show that the long held belief that the early war plans devised
in the late 19th and earlier 20th centuries were exercises in futility is a mistaken one. The early
color coded war plans served purposes far beyond that of just exercising the minds and intellect
of the United States most gifted and talented military leaders. Rather, given the demands
imposed by advances in military warfare and technology, contingency war planning was a
necessary precaution required of all responsible powers at the dawn of the 20th century.
Also contrary to previous assumptions, America’s contingency war planning was a
realistic response to the course of domestic and international affairs. The advanced war plan
scenarios were based on actual real world alliances and developments in international relations,
this truth defies previous criticisms that early war planners were not cognizant of world affairs or
developments in U.S. bilateral relations with other nations.2 This thesis reveals that the U.S.
military’s color coded war plans were part of a clear, continuous evolution of American military
strategy culminating in the creation of Rainbow Five, the Allied plan for victory during the
Second World War. Furthermore, this thesis demonstrates that the individuals who helped to
develop these war plans often stood on the shoulders of their predecessors, drawing from the
experiences of prior U.S. military conflicts as well as the work of previous graduates of the
Army War College.
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Only three authors have focused on America’s color coded contingency war plans. The
most famous work is arguably Edward S. Miller’s War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat
Japan, 1897-1945, which deals specifically with the United States color coded contingency war
plan against Japan. The next author to have written on U.S. contingency war planning is Steven
T. Ross, whose two books are American War Plans, 1890-1939 and U.S. War Plans, 1939-1945.
Ross’s first book provides a detailed analysis of each single color-coded war plan, while the
second looks specifically at the different Rainbow Plans and the development of Allied strategy
during World War II. Lastly, is Henry G. Gole’s The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for
Global War, 1934-1940, which examines the work of students at the Army War College (AWC)
in Washington D.C. during the 1930’s.
Each work offers a needed contribution to the historiography of contingency warplanning. But, each work, in a way, remains incomplete. Miller asserts in War Plan Orange that
that particular war plan was the “most successful in history.”3 Regardless of the validity of his
statement, Miller uttered it without knowledge of Gole’s The Road to Rainbow and the existence
of Rainbow X. Ross also wrote his two works without the knowledge of Gole’s work. Due to this
fact, he incorrectly wrote in 1997 that “It was not until after the 1938 Munich crisis that military
planners began to explore American responses to further initiatives by the revisionist powers.”4
Gole, while aware of both Miller and Ross’ works, did not connect the Rainbow Plans or the
student plans at the AWC to the earlier plans. While Gole does mention the existence of these
plans, he fails to note the connection between them and the Rainbow plans.
This thesis will also demonstrate the necessity of these war plans in light of the historical
commitments and conflicts which the United States encountered due to two of its most cherished
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historical policies, the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny. The purpose of chapter one is to
demonstrate that the Monroe Doctrine alone necessitated the existence of contingency war plans
against or in assistance of the nations of the Western Hemisphere, and that it continued to inspire
war plans through the start of the Second World War. The subject of chapter two is Manifest
Destiny or the desire of American statesmen to expand not only the territory but the influence of
the United States and therefore to demonstrate that these policies often placed America on a
possible collision course with its potential enemies. This chapter will also address two of these
potential enemies, Great Britain and Japan, and questions Ross’ claim that “The probabilities of
such wars were at best remote.”5 The remainder of chapter two will examine some of the lesson
known war plans and historical precedent behind their development. Lastly, chapter three will
link the older color coded war plans with later Rainbow Plans, looking at both Gole’s
contributions to this field as well as the Rainbow Plans themselves.
After the American Civil War (1861-1865) the United States stretched from Atlantic to
the Pacific. With renewed vigor, U.S. foreign policy attempted to extend an exclusive American
sphere of influence not only over the Western Hemisphere, but after the turn of the 20th century,
over the Pacific Rim and regions beyond as well. The attempt to do so naturally set the United
States on a collision course with other nations, whether or not those potential enemies were
neighbors of the United States or extra-hemispheric colonial powers.6 As the United States
expanded its sphere of influence to include areas not formerly considered to be vital to American
interests, so too did the list of potential conflicts that the nation might encounter. Early in the 20th
century, such considerations led to the development of U.S. contingency war planning. This new
system took the form of a color-coded scheme which identified the United States as Blue and its
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potential enemies by other colors. While some historians have doubted the necessity of such war
planning, these color-coded war plans were not exercises in futility, for some would evolve into
the Allied strategy for victory in World War II, known today as Rainbow Five.7
Rainbow Five and the rainbow plans which preceded it were drafted between 1939 and
1941 and were based on five hypothetical situations. Rainbow One was a plan of defensive war
to protect the United States and the Western Hemisphere north of ten degrees latitude. In this
scenario, the United States was assumed to be without any major allies. Rainbow Two assumed
that the United States would be allied with both Great Britain and France and that both of those
countries would be able to hold their own against Germany in Europe and possibly provide some
assistance to the United States in the Pacific. The expectation that the Allies would be able to
counter Germany in Europe under Rainbow Two would permit the United States to focus on
conducting an Allied offensive in the Pacific against Japan. Rainbow Three was simply to be an
implementation of War Plan Orange, the classic U.S. strategy to defeat Japan, after the United
States hemispheric defense was first secured, as called for in Rainbow One. Rainbow Four
extended the United States hemispheric defense to include the rest of South America. Rainbow
Five, which ultimately became the foundation for U.S. strategy during World War II, provided
that the United States was allied with both Britain and France. Unlike Rainbow Two, however,
the United States would be involved in offensive operations in Europe and possibly even North
Africa.8 Rainbow Five was the culmination of nearly fifty years of war planning experience and
the fruits of a military reform movement which began before the turn of the 20th century.
Late in the 19th century the U.S. Navy had benefitted from the growing
professionalization movement popular in the United States at the time with the establishment of
7
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the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in 1882. The ONI’s purpose was ostensibly to collect
information on enemy naval strength, a necessary perquisite for naval war planning. Another
important element in the professionalization of the U.S. Navy was the establishment of the Naval
War College in 1884.9 One of the teachers at the newly established school was the soon to be
famous Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan whose The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (1890)
became required reading for navies around the world. One of Mahan’s significant improvements
for the U.S. Navy was the introduction of written war plans during peacetime, which later
became known as contingency war plans.10
In previous conflicts the United States had just declared war and then called for
volunteers, while the president and his generals devised a strategy to win the war. Thus, previous
U.S. military war plans had been created on an ad hoc basis.11 However, due to the everchanging nature of war and to the advancement of the technology utilized in war, the older way
of doing things became inadequate. A nation mobilized for war was very much like a war
machine whose gears, once in motion, were hard to stop; therefore, a pre-planned strategy
needed to be devised and implemented. As improvements in transportation and communications
greatly shortened the available time for mobilization, reactionary planning was too hectic and
military strategy needed to have long term objectives which could be fixed, in spite of setbacks.12
The U.S. Army also began to draft contingency war plans around the same time, and the
practice became a common feature in Army planning after the U.S. Army War College opened
its doors in 1904 under the direction of Tasker Bliss. At first, both the U.S. Army and Navy War
Colleges developed their own separate war plans, as each class was assigned a strategic problem,
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usually one dealing with a war between the United States and one or a combination of countries.
Some of these war plans were useful, like those developed for a war against Spain in the years
prior to the Spanish-American War, while others were somewhat more fanciful, such as one
unusual scenario which pitted the United States and France against Great Britain and Spain.13
Such war planning would remain the sole responsibility of each of the respective war
colleges until the creation of the Joint Army and Navy Board in 1903. The pitiful and often
embarrassing problems encountered by the U.S. military during the Spanish-American War,
problems which dealt mostly with inter-service cooperation between U.S. Army and Naval
forces, gave rise to the establishment of the Joint Board.14 One such example was General
William Shafter’s neglecting to ask for naval gunfire support before attacking the defensive
works outside Santiago, Cuba.15 While both the U.S. Army and Navy War Colleges continued to
submit their own war plans, the Joint Board now had final review of the plans before they could
be submitted to the president for final approval.16
The Joint Board issued the first color-coded scheme for identifying foreign governments
in 1904. The original color scheme designated Red for Great Britain, Black for Germany, Orange
for Japan, White for France, Yellow for Spain, Grey for Italy, Green for Russia, Crimson for
Austria-Hungary, and Saffron for China. Other nations only received simple initial designations,
for instance Hd. for Holland, Dk. for Denmark, Ca. for Colombia, Va. for Venezuela, Bl. for
Brazil, and Ci. for Chile.17 The board later changed some of these: France became Gold, Spain
became Olive, China became Yellow, Italy became Silver, Central America and the Caribbean in
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general became Grey, Russia became Purple, Mexico became Green, Canada became Crimson,
and South America in general became Violet. Also, an insurgency in the Philippines became
Brown and after World War I, a domestic insurrection in the United States became White.18 In
these war plans the United States was almost always identified as Blue.19
The purpose of using colors instead of names was to avoid a potential diplomatic
embarrassment should any of the plans be leaked to the press. From its inception in 1903 until
the U.S. entry into World War I, the Joint Board, and then after the war, the Joint Planning
Committee (JPC), focused on war plans designed to protect the nation’s interests. The JPC was a
select committee made up of six naval war planners and six army war planners chosen by the
Joint Board. After the war, the Joint Board in effect outsourced its war planning responsibilities
to the JPC. The most important objective of almost every war plan written until the Second
World War, with the exceptions of War Plan Orange, Brown and Yellow was based on the
United States defense of the Western Hemisphere and the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine.20
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CHAPTER I: THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND MILITARY PLANNING

As the United States became more assertive in its foreign policy after the SpanishAmerican War, one tool it tried to use to extend its sphere of influence over the rest of the
Western Hemisphere was the Monroe Doctrine. Although the Monroe Doctrine was more of a
tradition than actual law, defense of that unofficial policy continued to remain one of the main
objectives of contingency planning even prior to the Second World War. The Monroe Doctrine,
originally drafted in 1823 by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, and pronounced to the
world by President James Monroe in an annual address to Congress, became a cornerstone of
U.S. foreign policy over the century which followed.21 The evolution of the Monroe Doctrine
over the next century would gradually commit the United States to intervene in an increasing
variety of situations, leading U.S. war planners to be ever mindful of America’s self-proclaimed
responsibilities before the eyes of the world.22
In his address, President Monroe declared the Western Hemisphere to henceforth be offlimits to further colonization by the European powers and insisted that they not interfere in the
internal affairs of any of the recently independent Spanish American republics. As a quid pro
quo Monroe added that the United States would not meddle with existing European colonies in
the Western Hemisphere or in Europe itself. Implicit in the Monroe Doctrine, however, was the
idea that the United States alone should complete the remaining settlement of the Western
Hemisphere.23 This address ultimately led to the development of contingency plans for U.S.
military actions in the Western Hemisphere.
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Characteristic of the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine was the tendency by various
American statesmen to add their own personal corollaries or addendums to the Monroe Doctrine.
The first to reaffirm the Monroe Doctrine was President James K. Polk in his first annual address
to Congress on December 2, 1845. In his message, Polk asserted that “It is well known to the
American people and to all nations that this Government has never interfered with the relations
subsisting between other governments. We have never made ourselves parties to their wars or
their alliances; we have not sought their territories by conquest; we have not mingled with parties
in their domestic struggles; and believing our own form of government to be the best, we have
never attempted to propagate it by intrigues, by diplomacy, or by force. We may claim on this
continent a like exemption from European interference.”24 Polk continued:
“The nations of America are equally sovereign and independent with those of
Europe. They possess the same rights, independent of all foreign interposition, to
make war, to conclude peace, and to regulate their internal affairs. The people of
the United States can not, therefore, view with indifference attempts of European
powers to interfere with the independent action of the nations on this continent.
The American system of government is entirely different from that of Europe.
Jealousy among the different sovereigns of Europe, lest any one of them might
become too powerful for the rest, has caused them anxiously to desire the
establishment of what they term the "balance of power." It can not be permitted to
have any application on the North American continent, and especially to the
United States. We must ever maintain the principle that the people of this
continent alone have the right to decide their own destiny.”

Thinking of the newly-independent Republic of Texas, Polk added “Should any portion
of them, constituting an independent state, propose to unite themselves with our Confederacy,
this will be a question for them and us to determine without any foreign interposition. We can
never consent that European powers shall interfere to prevent such a union because it might
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disturb the "balance of power" which they may desire to maintain upon this continent.”25 The
desire to avoid the creation of a “balance of power” system on the North American continent
explains why various European countries came to be viewed as potential enemies by the United
States, and why it was important to have contingency plans against them.
The concept of avoiding a “balance of power” in North America was not new to
President Polk. In 1783, George Washington wrote “this is the favorable moment to give such a
tone to our Federal Government, as will enable it to answer the ends of its institution, or this may
be the ill-fated moment for relaxing the powers of the Union, annihilating the Cement of the
Confederation, and exposing us to become the sport of European politics, which may lay one
State against another to prevent their growing importance, and to serve their own interested
purposes.”26 In Federalist 8, Alexander Hamilton warned that “if we should be disunited, and the
integral parts should remain separated, or, which is most probable, should be thrown together
into two or three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the
continental powers of Europe – our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending ourselves
against the ambition and jealousy of each other.”27
Another American statesmen, John Jay, warned of the same when he wrote in Federalist
4 that disaster would follow if the United States “split into three or four independent and
probably discordant republics or confederacies, one inclining to Britain, another to France, and a
third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by the three…” In Federalist 7 again
Hamilton wrote of “the probability of incompatible alliances between different States, or
confederacies, and different foreign nations,” and “America, if not connected at all, or only by
25
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the feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive, would, by the operation of such jarring
alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars;
and by the destructive contentions of the parts into which she was divided, would be likely to
become prey to the artifices and machinations of powers equally the enemies of the all. Divide et
impera [divide and rule] must be the motto of every nation that hates or fears us…” John Quincy
Adams, echoed these statements when he said that if the Union is “broken, we shall soon divide
into a parcel of petty tribes at perpetual war with one another, swayed by rival European powers,
whose policy will agree perfectly in the system of keeping us at variance with one another.”28
George Washington eloquently proclaimed in his Farewell Address:

“While, then, every part of our country thus feels an immediate and particular
interest in Union, all the parts combined cannot fail to find in the united mass of
means and efforts greater strength, greater resource, proportionably greater
security from external danger, a less frequent interruption of their peace by
foreign nations; and, what is of inestimable value, they must derive from Union
an exemption from those broils and wars between themselves, which so
frequently afflict neighbouring countries not tied together by the same
governments, which their own rivalships alone would be sufficient to produce, but
which opposite foreign alliances, attachments, and intrigues would stimulate and
embitter. Hence, likewise, they will avoid the necessity of those overgrown
military establishments, which, under any form of government, are inauspicious
to liberty, and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to Republican
Liberty. In this sense it is, that your Union ought to be considered as a main prop
of your liberty, and that the love of the one ought to endear to you the
preservation of the other.”29
No doubt with such concerns in mind, Polk alluded to the Monroe Doctrine when he
added “Near a quarter of a century ago the principle was distinctly announced to the world, in the
annual message of one of my predecessors, that-- The American continents, by the free and
independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be
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considered as subjects for colonization by any European powers. This principle will apply with
greatly increased force should any European power attempt to establish any new colony in North
America.” He then reiterated the principles of the Monroe Doctrine and asserted his support. He
reassured European leaders of his respect for them but reminded them that it was “our settled
policy that no future European colony or dominion shall without our consent be planted or
established on any part of the North American continent.”30
The first major addition to the Monroe Doctrine came at the close of the MexicanAmerican War. Amidst the near total breakdown and disintegration of the Mexican government,
native Indian tribes living on the Yucatan peninsula staged an uprising to overthrow white criollo
rule in the Yucatan-Caste War of 1848. These Mexican whites, on the verge of being wiped out,
asked for foreign intervention in order to help secure the territory and to establish law and order
there.31 In their plea, they hinted that they would welcome annexation to any foreign government
that would assist them. The offer was directed at the United Kingdom, Spain and the United
States. Although President Polk seriously debated annexing the Yucatan territory, he decided
against it because it was not contiguous to any U.S. territory and it might undermine the ongoing
peace efforts with Mexico.32
This did not, however, prevent the British or the Spanish from taking up the offer;
therefore Polk made it very clear to all the European powers that the United States would not
recognize any transfer of sovereignty from an American territory to a European power, even if it
was by invitation. Furthermore, the U.S. government would regard any annexation as a move
hostile towards the United States. This declaration became known as the Polk Doctrine or Polk’s
30

President James K. Polk, First Annual Message to Congress on December 2, 1845, The American Presidency
Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29486 , accessed on 04/15/10.
31
Thomas M. Leonard, James K. Polk: A Clear and Unquestionable Destiny (Scholarly Resources Inc.,
Wilmington, DE, 2001), 181-184.
32
Ibid.

12

Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In a statement on April 28, 1848, Polk announced “Whilst it is
not my purpose to recommend the adoption of any measure with a view to the acquisition of the
‘dominion and sovereignty’ over Yucatan, yet according to our established policy, we could not
consent to a transfer of this ‘dominion and sovereignty’ either to Spain, Great Britain or any
other European power.”33 However, Polk left it to Congress to adopt measures that would
prevent the Yucatan’s affiliation with a European power.34
Over the next half-century other presidents and foreign policy makers offered their own
interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine. In the 1870s Secretary of State Hamilton Fish prevailed
upon President Ulysses S. Grant to reiterate the Polk corollary to the Monroe Doctrine during a
debate over the annexation of Santo Domingo (now known as the Dominican Republic), which
had essentially offered itself to Spain. Grant declared “I now deem it proper to assert the equally
important principle that hereafter no territory on this continent shall be regarded as subject to
transfer to a European power.” 35 President Rutherford B. Hayes alluded to the Monroe Doctrine
when he proclaimed to the French government that “the policy of this country is a canal under
American control”36 as did Secretary of State James G. Blaine when he told the British that the
U.S.-U.K. Clayton–Bulwer Treaty, which provided for joint control of any proposed canal across
Central America was null and void because it conflicted with the Monroe Doctrine and the
United States’ “rightful and long established claim to priority on the American continent.”37
A Russian official also complained that the Monroe Doctrine “enters more and more into
the veins of the people… and the latest generation imbibes it with its mother’s milk and inhales it

33

President James K. Polk, First Annual Message to Congress on December 2, 1845, The American Presidency
Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=68004 , accessed on 04/15/10.
34
Ibid.
35
Louis Arthur Coolidge, Ulysses S. Grant (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin, 1917), 322.
36
Zimmerman, First Great Triumph, 32.
37
Ibid.

13

with the air.”38 According to the German Foreign office, during the dispute between Germany
and the United States over Samoa in 1880s, Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard had
reinterpreted the Monroe Doctrine “as though the Pacific Ocean were to be treated as an
American lake.”39 U.S President William McKinley asserted as much when he issued a stern
warning to Japan when it applied pressure on the American dominated Republic of Hawaii in
1896, causing the Hawaiian minister to rejoice that the United States had essentially extended the
Monroe Doctrine to Hawaii by placing it under American protection.40
During the Venezuelan border dispute between Venezuela and Great Britain, in the 1890s
Secretary of State Richard Olney added his own corollary to the Monroe Doctrine by asserting
that the United States now had the authority to mediate any border disputes in Latin America.
Olney declared that "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its
fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.... its infinite resources
combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable
as against any or all other powers.”41 What made Olney’s declaration on the Monroe Doctrine so
significant was that for the first time the United States asserted the Monroe Doctrine against the
United Kingdom itself, the one nation upon which the United States had formerly relied on for
the enforcement of that very policy. The First Venezuelan Crisis was a coming of age moment
for the Monroe Doctrine, as the United States made it clear that it was now strong enough to
enforce the policy without any assistance.42
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Sir Edward Grey, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs wrote that “The Americans
have a policy associated with the name of Monroe, the cardinal point of which is that no
European or non-American nation should acquire fresh territory on the continent of America. If
it be, as I think it must be, a postulate of any successful arbitration treaty of any extended kind
that there should be no conflict, or possibility of conflict, between the national policies of the
nations who are parties to it, this condition is assumed between us.”43 During the Second
Venezuelan Crisis in 1902, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy attempted to use force to collect
debts owed to their citizens by the Venezuelan government, however, before they did so they
made clear their intentions to the U.S. government. The German Government even went so far as
to state that “we consider it of importance first of all to let the government of the United States
know about our purposes, so that we can prove that we have nothing else in view than to help
those of our citizens who have suffered damages… We declare especially that under no
circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or the permanent occupation of
Venezuelan territory.”44
In 1902, during the Venezuelan debt crisis these European powers attempted to coerce
Venezuela by blockading the Venezuelan coast. In response, Argentinean foreign minister Louis
Maria Drago attempted to forestall any invasion of Venezuela when he declared “that the public
debt cannot occasion armed intervention, or even the occupation [temporary or permanent] of the
territory of American nations by a European power.”45 The Drago Doctrine attempted to carry
itself as an official proclamation on behalf of all of the countries of the Western Hemisphere.
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Unfortunately for Drago, President Roosevelt had other ideas.46 Instead, Roosevelt accepted the
assurances given by the European powers when he declared to the United States Congress that
“The Monroe Doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial actions of any American power…
We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that the
punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power.”47
Still, the potential for a future conflict led him to issue what would later be called the
Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt expounded upon the original doctrine by
declaring in 1904 that:
“If a nation shows that it knows how to act with decency in industrial and political
matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, then it need not fear any
interference from the United States. Brutal wrongdoing, or an impotence which
results in a general loosening of the ties of a civilized society, may in America, as
elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the
Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine
may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such
wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.” 48
In his redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt laid down his understanding that
the United States alone had to authority to maintain order in the Western Hemisphere.49
The Monroe Doctrine, which once only applied to European powers, would soon be
applied to non-European powers as well. Early in 1912, rumors began to circulate that a strategic
bay in Mexico’s Baja California with conditions ideal for harboring naval forces was going to be
sold to Japanese owned business interests. After the press picked up the story, outrage poured
into Washington D.C. In order to address the issue, Henry Cabot Lodge successfully sponsored a
resolution expanding the definition of a “colonizing power” in the Monroe Doctrine to include
46
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international corporations. Lodge stated “By the word ‘colonization’ we also cover action by
companies or corporations by citizens or subjects of a foreign state which might do… what the
Monroe Doctrine sought to prevent.”50 This resolution became known as the Lodge Corollary to
the Monroe Doctrine.
Later in Lodge’s career during the debate over the Treaty of Versailles, he was so intent
on the preservation of the Monroe Doctrine that he demanded that the League of Nations
acknowledge the United States right to enforce it, as one of his reservations to the Treaty. In
treaty reservation number 5, Lodge wrote that the United States would not submit any questions
to the League of Nations for arbitration which in the judgment of the United States depend upon
or relate to its long-established policy, commonly known as the Monroe Doctrine;” and that the
“said doctrine is to be interpreted by the United States alone and is hereby declared to be wholly
outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations...”51 After the United States rejected the Treaty
of Versailles, the League of Nations became viewed to be an alliance by some war planners and
its influence in the Western Hemisphere was treated like that of a colonial power.
The last official interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine before World War II came in 1928
with the Clark Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine. The memorandum was actually less of a
reinterpretation than it was an attempted explanation of the Monroe Doctrine. Starting in the late
1920s, a number of U.S. foreign policy experts began to argue for a more cordial tone in U.S.
relations with Latin American nations. These nations had largely resented the nearly three
decades of intervention by the “colossus to the north” in their region. Undersecretary of State
Joshua Reuben Clark (1871-1961) was one of those who held these conciliatory views.52 In a
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memorandum dated December 17, 1928, Clark argued first, that every nation, including the
United States, had the right of "self-preservation" and for the United States the principle of selfpreservation underlay the basis of the Monroe Doctrine. Second, the United States alone made
the decision about when to intervene on behalf of Latin American nations. Thirdly, the Monroe
Doctrine was not concerned with inter-American relations per se, but rather, with the relationship
between the United States and the other nations of the Hemisphere when European interference
in those countries threatened U.S. the security of the United States. Fourthly, the Monroe
Doctrine stated a case of the United States versus Europe, not the United States versus Latin
America. Thus, the Monroe Doctrine related to the relationship of the United States and Latin
America on one side and Europe on the other, not the United States pitted against Latin America.
Fifthly, the primary purpose of the Monroe Doctrine was to protect Latin American nations from
foreign intervention by European powers and was not meant to be used as a tool to victimize or
oppress Latin American nations. Clark argued, therefore, that the application of the Monroe
Doctrine by the United States was meant to be beneficial to the Latin American states as well as
to the United States.53
Maintaining the status quo in the Western Hemisphere or tilting the balance of power
further in America’s favor became the chief end of U.S. foreign policy after the American Civil
War. Upholding the Monroe Doctrine was regarded as essential for achieving either of these two
objectives. It was not until the late 1890s, however, that the United States could actually defend
its interests and enforce the Monroe Doctrine without British assistance and, as the United States
demonstrated during the First Venezuela Crisis, Great Britain would now be held accountable to
observing that long established policy; therefore, contingency war planning reflected real-time
geopolitical concerns and potential opponents were seen as possible threats to American interests
53

Sessions, “The Clark Memorandum Myth,” 40-58.

18

in the Western Hemisphere. Overall, U.S. contingency war-planning could generally be divided
into two categories, inter-hemispheric or global conflict.
While a global conflict involving the United States would most likely occur in the event
of a European power’s violation of the Monroe Doctrine, inter-hemispheric conflicts dealt solely
with American conflicts with continental neighbors or the quelling of domestic insurrections in
the same. Some potential global conflicts may have involved the United States in war with any
variety of colonial powers still with holdings in the Western Hemisphere, which as of 1890 when
contingency war planning began, included Great Britain, France, Spain, Denmark and Holland.
Such conflicts could also have involved countries that potentially sought to acquire new holdings
in the Western Hemisphere, including Germany and Italy. Meanwhile, some potential interhemispheric conflicts usually had their origins in historical U.S. diplomatic relations with its
neighbors, like those with Mexico.54
As a result of the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States took upon itself
many new commitments and in the process pledged itself to prevent a balance of power system
from developing on the North American continent; the further colonization of the New World by
any Old World power; the voluntary transfer of any American territory from an American nation
to a non-American nation; the transfer of an American territory from one of the Great Powers to
another; the Great Powers from expanding their American territories at the expense of any of the
American nations; the Great Powers from collecting debts by force from American nations, and
finally and any foreign businesses owned by a foreign power from acquiring land in the Western
Hemisphere. It was not until 1898, however, that the United States went to war to attempt to
expel a European power from the Western Hemisphere.
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After the Spanish evacuation from the American mainland in the early 19th century, the
main flashpoint for a potential conflict between Spain and the United States shifted to the island
colony of Cuba. Cuba and Puerto Rico made up Spain’s last remaining colonial territories in the
Western Hemisphere. American statesman as far back as Thomas Jefferson had desired to annex
Cuba. When Jefferson heard that Great Britain might purchase Cuba from Spain, he protested
stating that it was in America’s best interests that Cuba remain in the hands of a weak power like
Spain rather than be transferred to a strong power like Great Britain. So long as Cuba remained
in the hands of a Spain that was weak enough not to pose a threat to the United States but strong
enough to protect U.S. interests, the United States would tolerate Spanish possession of Cuba.55
As far back as the mid-19th century, Cuba’s stability had been a major concern for U.S.
statesmen. During that time, Southern plantation owners saw Cuba as a possibly valuable target
for acquisition as a slave state; therefore, they made many attempts to negotiate the purchase of
Cuba. The first major attempt to purchase Cuba came in the summer of 1848 when President
Polk authorized the U.S ambassador to Spain, Romulus M. Saunders to offer the Spanish
government up to $100 million dollars for the territory.56 The next attempt occurred in 1854 with
the Ostend Manifesto. The Ostend Manifesto, however, took a more forceful tone, declaring that
Cuba was vital to the stability of the American social order because if any slave rebellion such as
the one that occurred on Santo Domingo in the 1790s ever occurred in Cuba, it might spread to
the southern United States; therefore the manifesto gave Spain two options, sell Cuba to the
United States or face a potential war with it. Once word spread of the Ostend Manifesto,
however, the Pierce administration quickly distanced itself from the document.57

55

David M. Pletcher, The Diplomacy of Trade and Investment: American Economic Expansion in the Hemisphere,
1865-1900 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1998) 362.
56
Robert Ferrell, American Diplomacy (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1975), 232.
57
Ibid., 232-233.

20

Shortly after the American Civil War ended, the Ten Years War (1868-1878) broke out
on the “ever-faithful isle” of Cuba. At this point, Cuba was not only the last major Spanish
colony in the Western Hemisphere, it was also one of the last remaining slave societies in the
New World. The Ten Years War was the first major Cuban revolt against Spanish rule, and it
saw many different factions vying for power in the struggle. Among these factions were
Loyalists or those who wanted Cuba to remain a Spanish colony. The Loyalists contained in their
ranks both those who were happy with the status quo and those who just wanted more autonomy
for Cuba. Opposing the Loyalists were groups that called for either complete independence from
Spain or those who wanted annexation to the United States.58
The perfect opportunity for war with Spain came in 1873 in the midst of the Ten Years
War when a U.S merchant ship called the Virginius was halted and boarded in the waters off of
Cuba. The ship was owned by an American citizen who was transporting weapons to rebel forces
in Cuba, but it was also carrying American and British citizens who were apparently part of a
filibustering expedition. Fifty three of the crew and passengers, including some Americans and
Britons, were executed as pirates. This incident led to a public outcry in the United States and
some demands for a war with Spain. With the U.S. military preoccupied with the Reconstruction
of the South, however, the United States settled only for minor compensation in the form of an
indemnity. The Ten Years War finally came to an end in 1878 when the Spanish finally crushed
the revolt.59
When the Cuban War of Independence (1895-1898) broke out in 1895, the American
public sympathized with the Cuban people, as stories of Spanish atrocities were printed and
spread by the “Yellow” press. Many Americans, including some vocal U.S. imperialists, now
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supported American intervention in the crisis.60 The sinking of the U.S.S. Maine in January 1898
provided the necessary spark to ignite an American war with Spain. In what would become
known as the Spanish-American War, in only four months the United States defeated Spain.
With its victory, the United States acquired an empire which stretched all the way from the
Philippine Archipelago in the Western Pacific to Puerto Rico in the Eastern Caribbean.61
When Cuba achieved its official independence in 1902 after a brief period of American
occupation, it was by no means a truly independent nation. The United States insisted that
Cubans include the Platt Amendment as part of their Constitution. The Platt Amendment gave
the United States the right to send troops to intervene and restore order in Cuba if any American
interests were threatened. The United States would go on to invoke the Platt Amendment in
1906-1909, 1912, and from 1917-1920. The Platt Amendment would be in effect until the Treaty
of Relations between Cuba and the United States was signed in 1934 by Franklin Delano
Roosevelt as part of his “Good Neighbor Policy.” For the duration of a nearly 30 year period,
Cuba was in effect a protectorate of the United States. As a result of the Platt Amendment, the
United States drafted War Plan Tan to deal with the contingency of an insurrection on Cuba
against U.S. occupation or a violent revolution which threatened U.S. interests in Cuba such as
some of the situations envisioned by the Platt amendment.62
After quoting the Platt Amendment in War Plan Tan, U.S. war planners noted that “the
United States has intervened in Cuba in the past…” and the “occasion for further intervention
may arise in the future.” The documents also stated that “On account of the variety of causes
which may lead to intervention in Cuba, it is considered inadvisable to base the Joint Plan upon
any special or particular military situation. It is believed to be sufficient if the Plan provides for
60
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an intervention without a declaration of War and with or without military support, for the
purpose of establishing a sufficient and stable government in Cuba.” Point 6 stated “In view of
the Treaty provisions above quoted, which have in substance been embodied in the Cuban
Constitution, it is not anticipated that organized resistance to intervention will be encountered.
On the other hand, opposition may be offered by discontented political factions, guerillas or
bandits.” Point 7 continued, “The regular Army and Navy (including the Marine Corps, but
excluding the Coast Guard) at peace strength are considered sufficient in strength to accomplish
successfully any operations which may become necessary in such an intervention.”63 Planners
also noted that “On account of the almost insignificant naval strength of Cuba and the strong
probability that any operations of a military nature required will involve the use of Army forces
only, it is considered that the Army has paramount interest.”64
The purpose of War Plan Tan was “the most effective employment of the Army and
Navy forces of the United States in an intervention in CUBA, undertaken under the provisions of
the Treaty which was proclaimed July 2, 1904.” Along with the overall purpose of the plan came
several key assumptions. The document states that the plan was undertaken deal with situations
requiring the United States intervention in Cuba. There were several variations of Plan Tan; “(1)
Variation A. Intervention without military support, or (2) Variation B. Establishment of a
Provisional Government with military support.” Some other key assumptions were that “The
situation in CUBA is such that serious organized resistance to intervention is not expected.”
Also, “Nothing in the international situation indicates the intervention will be opposed by any
foreign power…” and lastly, “The operations will be initiated without a declaration of war.”65
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The national mission of the United States in Cuba under Plan Tan was that of
“…protecting United States and other foreign interests in the Republic of Cuba, to intervene in
that country for the purpose of preserving Cuban independence and maintaining a government
adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty, either with military support, or
without military support, as may be directed by the President.” The Army’s specific mission
under Plan Tan was “To establish a stable and efficient government in the Republic of Cuba,
either without military support (Variation A), or with military support (Variation B), as may be
directed by the President: and to protect United States and other foreign interests in the Republic
of CUBA.” The Navy’s specific mission under Plan Tan was “To extend to the United States and
other foreign interests in CUBA seaports such protection as may be required prior to the arrival
of Army forces; to support and assist the landing of Army forces in CUBA; and, thereafter, to
cooperate with the Army in the execution of the Army Mission and to render such assistance to
the Army as may be requested by the Commanding General, American Intervention Force.”66
Specific theatres of operation were assigned to each branch of the military by the Joint
Board under the two different variations. Variation B assigned “All CUBAN territory, exclusive
of the area included within the limits of the U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay” to the Army
while Variation B assigned “All sea areas adjacent to the coasts of CUBAN territory, and the
area included within the limits of the U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay”67 to the Navy. For
Variation A the United States military acted as an auxiliary to their Cuban counterparts, as it
stated “In accordance to the National Mission, under Variation A, U.S. Army and Navy officers
will serve as advisors to, or, if necessary replacements for, CUBAN officials; the officers being
required for these duties being furnished by the War Department, and by the Navy Department
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upon request of the War Department;”68 therefore, the U.S. military’s mission in Cuba under
Variation A was to rehabilitate the Cuban government, whereas under Variation B, it was to
establish a provisional government, essentially a military government under U.S. control.
As Variation B required more extensive operations by U.S. forces than Variation A, its
plans were more detailed. Under Variation B the mission of the Provisional Governor of Cuba
was to (1) “establish a Provisional government in Cuba for the maintenance of good order and
the restoration of the financial standing of the Cuban government” as well as to (2) “use
American forces for the preservation of law and order only when the civil and military agencies
of the Cuban government are unable to cope with the situation.”69 Under Variation B the
American Intervention Force would initially consist of one infantry division at peace strength
plus certain auxiliary troops. The document also stated that the War Department would augment
these forces if it was deemed necessary. The Navy’s role under Variation B was simply to assist
the Army in carrying out its mission in Cuba. In most versions of Plan Tan, military operations
were focused on the capture of major Cuban cities such as Havana, Santiago, and Cienfuegos.
The U.S. intervention in Cuba after the resignation of Cuban President Tomas Estrada
Palma in 1906 left U.S. forces with a situation seemed to somewhat parallel Plan Tan’s Variation
B. The absence of a stable government and forced the United States to land Marines in Cuba on
September 20, 1906. President Roosevelt asked then Secretary of War William Howard Taft to
establish a provisional government in Cuba. The Secretary of War, became the provisional
governor of Cuba. Soon thereafter Taft named American Charles Edward Magoon as the new
governor of Cuba.70 A lasting legacy of the second U.S. occupation of Cuba was the U.S.
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military’s assistance in training a permanent Cuban Army to replace the formerly ineffective
Rural Guard.71
Another intervention by the United States in Cuba which occurred in 1912 resembled
Variation A of War Plan Tan. On May 20, 1912, a major revolt threatened the stability of the
government. While the American trained Cuban Army successfully crushed the revolt in most
areas, a rebellion by black Cubans persisted in the Oriente province of Cuba. Since the Oriente
province was home to many U.S. owned sugar mills, American business interests became
particularly concerned over the situation and began pressing the U.S. government to intervene.
The government succumbed to the pressure, sending U.S. Marines into Cuba on May 31. By this
time, however, the Cuban government had the revolt under control. Nevertheless, the purpose of
the Marine landing was to assist the government and the military of Cuba, which was similar to
the intervention prescribed in Variation A of War Plan Tan.72
The final U.S. intervention in Cuba also resembled Variation A of Plan Tan. In 1916, the
Cuban General Mario Garcia Menocal won reelection amidst cries of electoral fraud. Since the
general was seen by many, especially Cuban Liberals, as being too closely tied to U.S. interests,
the Liberals staged an uprising the following year against Menocal’s rule. Since the United
States had just entered World War I in 1917, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson could not afford to
allow any instability in Cuba to challenge U.S. control over the island; therefore Wilson decided
to back Menocal’s regime and if required, to provide the necessary force to do so. In response to
Menocal’s request, Wilson sent in 2,600 Marines to crush the liberal revolt in the Oriente and
Camaguey provinces. While most of the Marines left after the revolt was crushed, some were
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ordered to remain behind to protect U.S. properties. In none of these interventions, it should be
noted, did U.S. forces encounter any significant resistance to their occupation.73
Mexico has naturally been a source of concern for U.S presidents throughout U.S. history
because of its frequent political instability, close proximity, and vast, mostly unfortified northern
border.74After Wilson was elected president, he refused to recognize the government and rule of
the Mexican revolutionary Victoriano Huerta who came to power during the revolution in 1913.
When U.S. sailors from the U.S.S. Dolphin were arrested and taken prisoner in Tampico by an
officer loyal to Huerta’s government in April 1914, an international incident developed. Around
the same time, after hearing of an arrival of a shipment of weapons from Germany intended for
Huerta’s forces, Wilson used the refusal of the Mexican government as an excuse to land troops
at Veracruz in order to intercept the shipment. The ensuing skirmish left 126 Mexicans and 22
Americans dead.75 Later Wilson accepted mediation by the ABC Powers of Argentina, Brazil,
and Chile to end the crisis.
Still, as one Mexican dictator after another fell during the Mexican Revolution, the
instability in Mexico finally spilled over the U.S.-Mexican border when the bandit Pancho Villa
crossed over into Columbus, New Mexico and killed 18 Americans on March 9, 1916. This was
followed on May 15, when Villa’s bandits attacked Glen Springs, Texas, killing one civilian and
wounding three U.S. soldiers. This attack was followed by yet another on June 15, when Villa’s
bandits killed four more soldiers in San Ygnacio, Texas; and another attack on July 31, when one
U.S. soldier and a customs inspector were killed. Villa was trying to draw the United States into
a war with Mexico in order to topple the government of one of his rivals, General Venustiano
Carranza. Instead of declaring war on Mexico, however, Wilson ordered a punitive expedition
73
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under the command of General John “Blackjack” Pershing, to chase down Villa and bring him to
justice. By not formally declaring of war on Carranza’s Mexican government, President Wilson
was keeping a free hand to pull out of Mexico should war breakout with Imperial Germany.76
The Pershing Expedition resembled Zachary Taylor’s invasion of Northern Mexico during the
Mexican-American War between 1846 and 1847 as well as one of a multiple pronged invasion
called for in the existing war plans.77
Still, war planners had drawn up plans for an all-out war with Mexico. Wilson partially
implemented elements of what would become War Plan Green at various points throughout his
administration, just not in unison as the plan noted. Plan Green called for an invasion of Northern
Mexico, reminiscent of General Zachary Taylor’s campaign during the Mexican War and
Pershing’s Punitive Expedition, and also a landing at Veracruz followed by a March on Mexico
City reminiscent of General Winfield Scott’s campaign also during the Mexican War and similar
to the landing of troops at Veracruz in April 1914.78 The only addition to War Plan Green was
the option of a secondary landing at Tampico. Wilson’s actions in Mexico throughout his first
term reflected the advice of his military planners, just as U.S. war plans followed the precedent
of U.S. military history vis-à-vis the Mexican War. War Plan Green would be revised a number
of times until it was canceled in 1946 in order to foster better relations with Latin America.79
War planners had three variations of Plan Green. The first variation of Plan Green had as
its mission “to gain control of and establish order and stable government throughout Green, with
as little interference with the peaceful pursuits of the native population as may be consistent with
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the necessary military operations.”80 The U.S. Army’s specific mission under this plan was “to
invade, occupy, and pacify Green, maintaining a military Government until a stable, responsible
Green government can be established…” while also “protecting the border.” 81 The U.S. Navy’s
specific mission under this plan was “To control Green sea communications and to assist the
army in the occupation and pacification of Green.”82 The second variation of Green sought “to
expeditiously to gain control of Mexico City and Green communications, by military operations
limited generally to those against Green Federal forces.”83 The Army’s specific task under this
version of Green was “to capture Mexico City and gain control of the Green Federal Government
at the earliest practicable moment…,” while also “protecting the border by an active defense.”84
The Navy’s task was simply “to assist the Army in controlling the Green Federal Government.”85
The third variation of Plan Green had as its mission to “afford protection to the lives and
property of American citizens and of such foreign nationals as may require and request the same,
in cooperation, if practicable, with the recognized Green Government.”86 The Army’s specific
mission under this variation was “To protect the border, and to be prepared to seize and occupy
such areas adjacent to the seacoast of Green as may be necessary as protective measures by joint
operations with the Navy, or to support or relieve the Navy in such areas.”87 The Navy’s primary
tasks under this version were “To afford such protection to the lives and property of American
citizens and of such other foreign nationals as may require and request such protection, in or
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adjacent to seaports of Green.”88 Army tasks common to all plans were “1) Protection of the
southern border, 2) Interception, if ordered by the President, of munitions of war destined for
Green,” and also the “3) Transportation by sea of Army forces and their supplies, to overseas
destinations.” 89 Navy tasks common to all plans were “1) Containment, capture, or destruction
of hostile Green naval forces, 2) Removal of United States citizens, if circumstances warrant,
from Green ports on both seacoasts. NOTE: This provision may require occupation of such
ports.” and “3) Provision of security for the sea communications of the Army.”90
In addition to Mexico, the Caribbean was a natural area for the expansion of U.S.
influence after the Civil War because of its proximity and importance to America as a highway
for U.S. trade. The island of Hispaniola had long been a cause of both concern and intrigue to
Americans. After the Haitian Slave Revolt of 1791, the large island descended into a period of
poverty and despotism. Nearly seventy years of instability had plagued both of the nations on
Hispaniola, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. During the administration of Andrew Johnson
(1865-1868) there was talk of annexing both Haiti and the Dominican Republic.91 The latter of
the two even came to an agreement in which they practically offered their country up for sale to
the United States under Johnson’s successor, Ulysses S. Grant. Although Grant was interested in
the purchase his Republican colleagues in Congress were not and would not appropriate the
necessary funds to make the purchase, thus defeating the proposal.92 By the time the United
States entered World War I, however, it had already controlled of most of the Caribbean, with
protectorates over Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and a territory with Puerto Rico.
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After the purchase of the Danish Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1917, the only Caribbean
islands not under U.S. control were occupied by Great Britain, France, and Holland.93
War planners devised Plan Grey to deal with a possible conflict in any one or a number
of independent Central American or Caribbean republics. The plan called for the occupation of
major cities and military installations instead of a complete occupation which was to be avoided
if possible. The occupation of major coastal towns during the U.S. intervention in the Dominican
Republic in 1916 was a feature of Plan Gray, and the plan may have drawn some inspiration
from that intervention.94 The temporary military government established by the United States in
the Dominican Republic under Rear Admiral Harry Shepard Knapp seemed similar to Variation
B of Plan Tan, with U.S. naval officers serving as auxiliaries in a provisional government. After
the assassination of its long time dictator, Ulises Heureaux in 1899, the Dominican Republic had
fallen into anarchy and bloodshed. Over the next few years the United States would intervene to
protect American citizens and U.S. interests.95
In one instance, the U.S. Navy bombarded rebel positions in response to the murder of
one of their sailors. No significant intervention occurred until after a new Dominican government
stopped payment on foreign debts. As a result, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt’s Corollary to
the Monroe Doctrine was put to an early test. In order to forestall possible intervention by
European powers, Roosevelt agreed to establish a U.S. customs receivership over the Dominican
Republic. Roosevelt promptly placed a U.S. Army colonel in the position of a customs receiver,
and under a treaty signed in 1905 between the United States and Dominican governments, 55
percent of Santo Domingo’s revenue went toward paying down its foreign debt. As a result of

93

Ross, American War Plans, xi, 2, 34-35.
Ibid., 132-133.
95
Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, 168.
94

31

the customs receivership, the Dominican Republic took in more revenue than ever before and
was well on its way to paying down its debt.96
Despite progress on the financial front, the Dominican Republic’s political fortunes did
not improve. Instability after the assassination of Dominican President Ramon Caceres in 1911
continued for a few years until Woodrow Wilson insisted new elections be held in October 1914.
Juan Isidro Jimenez won the election, and was pressed by Wilson to allow a U.S. constabulary to
be set up in the Dominican Republic and to allow the expansion of the customs receivership set
up by Roosevelt. Jimenez seemed willingly to comply, but the Dominican Congress did not. In
fact, it was so resistant that it initiated impeachment proceedings against Jimenez. To make
matters worse Jimenez’s war minister, General Desiderio Arias began a revolt. Jimenez was
forced to flee the Dominican capital and seek the refuge of U.S. forces.97
Once there, Jimenez asked the U.S. military commander on the ground and the U.S.
minister in the Dominican Republic to request that Arias relinquish the capital. Arias refused.
Marine Major Frederic Wise then ordered the Marines into the capital of Santo Domingo on May
15, 1916. Arias wisely left with his men in the middle of the night. However, Arias and his men
still controlled the countryside and were determined to resist U.S. occupation. The Dominicans,
however, were no match for the U.S. Marines. Around 1,300 Marines secured the major coastal
towns and seized Arias’ stronghold Santiago de los Caballeros in little more than a month; thus,
the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic resembled War Plan Gray in that way. 98
When a revolution broke out in neighboring Haiti on July 27, 1915, U.S. and other
foreign nationals were threatened by the violence. After an attack on the French legation in Haiti,
Rear Admiral William B. Caperton, aboard the U.S.S. Washington anchored off the coast of the
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Haitian capital Port-Au-Prince, soon realized that the violence would inevitably lead to similar
attacks against U.S. interests in Haiti. The American, British, and French foreign ministers in
Haiti quickly sought refuge aboard the Washington. Caperton, anticipating an order to the same
effect, sent in the U.S. Marines to restore order in Port-Au-Prince. The Marines quickly took
control of the Haitian capital. Thus began what would become the nineteen year U.S. occupation
of Haiti. The U.S. invasion of Haiti in 1915 paralleled elements of Plan Gray with the immediate
occupation of several major coastal towns and areas like Port-Au-Prince.99
Passive resistance to U.S. rule in Haiti would not last, however, as the Cacos of northern
Haiti began to view U.S. authorities as a threat to their criminal operations. In September 1915,
the Cacos finally rose up against U.S. rule in Haiti, thus initiating the First Cacos War. The
Cacos began ambushing Marine patrols in the countryside. To deal with the Cacos, Major
Smedley Butler took 108 Marines to relieve the small coastal town of Gonaives, which was
under siege by 800 cacos under the command of General Pierre Rameau. While the Marines
under Butler were resting on September 20, 1915, they received word that Rameau’s men were
attacking some rail lines in town. Butler and his men grabbed their rifles and chased the Cacos
out of Gonaives. Butler would later go on to help pacify Haiti of the Cacos and thus played an
underrated role in ending the First Cacos War.100 With only three Marines killed in combat, the
U.S. military succeeded in doing what other nations failed to do, subdue the entire nation of
Haiti. Though War Plan Gray sought to avoid such situations, it never ruled them out.101
A number of interventions in other Central American countries during in the early 20th
century occurred, but most of these interventions, however, were mainly due to the actions of
one Central American country, Nicaragua. At the time, Jose Santos Zelaya ruled Nicaragua and
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had dreams of establishing a United States of Central America. Zelaya, therefore, provided aid to
liberal federalist factions in nearly every Central American country in hopes of achieving his
goal. Zelaya even threatened a general Central American war to achieve his dreams of power.
One of those countries whose liberal federalist factions received aid from Zelaya was Honduras.
Zelaya even succeeded in having these allies overthrow the Honduran government. The United
States began to see its interests in Central America threatened, especially those of the United
Fruit Company, the biggest employer in Central America. When Zelaya’s opponent, Juan J.
Estrada rebelled, U.S. Marines landed in the city of Bluefields, Estrada’s center of power, to
support him. Using Bluefields as a staging ground, the anti-Zelayista rebels took control of
Nicaragua and signed a treaty with the United States which placed Nicaragua under a customs
receivership similar to the one exercised by the United States in the Dominican Republic.102
U.S. interests in Nicaragua were again under siege when a Liberal revolt in 1912
threatened to topple the pro-U.S. government. President Taft ordered the Marines to protect the
U.S. legation in Managua, which had fallen under rebel attack. As more Marines arrived in
Nicaragua, U.S. forces were able to convince the rebel leader Luis Mena to negotiate an end to
the rebellion. There still remained one rebel leader in the field, however. General Benjamin
Zeldon’s forces were entrenched on two hills north of Managua, and Washington wanted them
removed. The ever bold Smedley Butler and Colonel Pendleton took the hills in a fierce firefight,
crushing the last of the rebellion and killing Zeldon somewhere in the process. The liberal revolt
of 1912, however, would not be the last.103
Against the advice of those on the ground in Nicaragua, President Calvin Coolidge
ordered U.S. forces out of Managua on August 3, 1925. Within a month, the country fell into
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chaos once again. Though U.S. Marines landed to protect U.S. interests at Bluefields in 1926,
Coolidge refused to recognize the rebel leader Chamorro, but also refused to intervene in the
Civil War. By 1927 it was clear that the pro-U.S. government would not survive on its own and
that some significant intervention needed to be undertaken. Once again, the United States sent
Marines into Nicaragua who proceeded to capture its principal Atlantic and Pacific seaports, and
to secure Managua and the main rail and transportation lines in the country, all very reminiscent
of War Plan Gray. The U.S. government continued to back the conservative government of
Nicaragua, sometimes with Marines, during the Constitutionalist Wars which ended in
compromise in 1933. Most of the U.S. forces left, however, in 1933.104
Arguably the most strategically important country or territory in the region to U.S.
interests was Panama. U.S. interest in Panama went all the way back to 1846, when the United
States signed a treaty for transit rights across the Isthmus with the Colombian government which
then controlled the territory. After the opening of a trans-isthmus railroad from Colon on the
Atlantic to Panama City on the Pacific and the creation of the Panama Railroad Company and the
Pacific Mail Steamship Company, Panama became an important transit route between the U.S.
East and West Coasts.105 In 1885, when the Colombian government was preoccupied with
revolts elsewhere in the country, the Panamanian rebel leader Rafael Azipuru seized Panama
City on the one side of the Isthmus while a Haitian mulatto named Pedro Prestan stirred up a
revolt in Colon. With the Colombians tied down with the other revolts, the quelling of the
Panamanian revolts was left to U.S. forces. Navy Secretary William C. Whitney under President
Grover Cleveland authorized an expeditionary force to secure the Panamanian railway under the
terms of the 1846 treaty. After securing the railway U.S. forces captured Panama City and
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arrested Azipuru, later turning him over to Colombian troops. This would not be the last U.S.
intervention in Panama, as U.S. Forces would land in Panama 13 times between 1856 and
1902.106
The most well-known U.S. intervention in Panama came after the United States signed
the Hay-Herran treaty with the Colombian government in 1903 for the building and leasing of a
Panama Canal by the United States, and the Colombian Senate refused to ratify the treaty on
August 12, 1903. Incensed, then President Theodore Roosevelt and his Secretary of State John
Hay tacitly encouraged a revolt which was building in Panama. With Panamanian revolutionaries
counting on U.S. military intervention, a revolt finally broke out in early November 1903. The
Colombian government responded by dispatching troops to the eastern terminus of the Panama
railway in Colon with the objective of utilizing the trans-isthmus railway to cross the Isthmus
and to crush the revolt in Panama City.107
The U.S.S. Nashville, however, received orders directly from the Navy Department to
“prevent landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either government or insurgent.” Still,
there were already some 500 Colombian troops in Colon, with possibly more on the way. The
American superintendent of the Panamanian railway told the Colombian general that he could
not transfer them all at once, so the General and his staff went ahead to Panama City where they
were promptly captured by the rebels. Meanwhile, off the coast of Colon, the U.S.S. Dixie
appeared with 400 Marines under the command of Major John A. Lejune. The Colombians did
not want to challenge the landing of these Marines, so they sailed back to Colombia, leaving
behind the de facto Republic of Panama to be recognized by the United States on November 6.108
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One of the first acts of the new government was to sign a treaty with the United States that was
almost identical to the one signed between the United States and Colombia.109
Although the United States never intervened militarily in a South American country in a
significant way, there were a few minor engagements in which U.S. forces were involved. Some
engagements occurred in the disputed Falkland Islands off the coast of Argentina in 1831, 1852
and 1890,110 as well as in Peru in 1835, Uruguay in 1855, 1858 and 1868.111 Though none of
these interventions resembled War Plan Violet, the frequency of them clearly demonstrated the
necessity of having war plans against these countries. Acknowledgement of these facts led to the
creation of War Plan Violet, a collection of war plans drafted by U.S. war planners for a conflict
against one or a number of possible opponents in South America. Like Plan Gray, Plan Violet
called for the occupation of major cities, especially port cities, and military installations in nearly
every South American nation, although no plans existed for the landlocked countries of Bolivia
and Paraguay. The potential catalysts for larger conflicts varied. For example, there were some
concerns that a revisionist Colombia might attempt to take back its former territory of Panama
with the U.S. controlled Panama Canal Zone.112 Venezuela’s border disputes with British Guiana
and its provocation of European investors also caused some concern. The intervention of Spain
in South America during the Chincha Islands War (1864-1866) angered U.S. officials, as did the
Baltimore Crisis with Chile. The Baltimore Crisis with Chile had very important implications for
the evolution of U.S. war planning.113
In 1891, after three U.S. ships, the U.S.S. Baltimore, U.S.S. San Francisco, and the U.S.S.
Charlestown intercepted the Itata, a Chilean ship carrying arms for rebel factions fighting against
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the government of Chile. Unfortunately, the rebel forces in Chile managed to take control of the
Chilean government anyway. Anti-American hostility boiled over when a Chilean mob attacked
U.S. sailors from the U.S.S. Baltimore on leave in Valparaiso, killing two and wounding several
others. U.S. President Benjamin Harrison, incensed by the attack on uniformed U.S. sailors, sent
a strongly worded message to the Chileans demanding reparations for the victims’ families. As
war clouds loomed over the two nations, Harrison authorized Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan to
draw up war plans against Chile and these became first U.S. contingency plans. Though the crisis
abated when the Chilean government offered compensation to the sailor’s families, war planning
became a permanent feature of the Naval War College when it resumed classes. Though the
Chilean War Plan came before the color designations, it would become part of the evolution of
War Plan Violet, which would be resurrected in the 1930s as War Plan Purple.114
Potential conflicts in South America were not always envisioned as coming from within
the continent, as there were fears that certain imperial have-nots might try to grab portions of the
Western Hemisphere, since colonies in the Old World were quickly disappearing. One of these
late comers to the game of empire was Germany. Ironically, of all European nations, Germany
was arguably the least likely candidate of all the Great Powers for a conflict with the United
States. Prussia was one of the first nations to enter into a commercial treaty with the newly
established United States. During the American Civil War, unlike Great Britain and France,
Prussia supported the Union. In return, during the Franco-Prussian War, the Union supported
Prussia and looked with favor on German Unification.115 However, like America, Germany was
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late in the game of empire building and wanted to take its “place in the Sun;” therefore, a
competition between them for acquiring new colonies often led to confrontations.116
Late in the 19th century Germany, Britain, and the United States established various
commercial posts on the Samoan islands. In 1878 the United States annexed Pago Pago for use
as a naval coaling station. In 1888 native disturbances resulted from the selection of a new king,
creating a crisis among the three powers. The matter was settled by the Act of Berlin in 1889,
which proclaimed the independence and neutrality of all the islands and guaranteed the natives
full liberty in the election of their king. Eleven years later in 1899, during the course of a native
civil war, the United States and Britain came to an informal alliance against the pretender to the
throne who was backed by Germany.117 Another agreement, however, was reached later that
same year. By the treaty concluded, Germany received the islands of Western Samoa and the
U.S. received the islands of eastern Samoa while Britain received the Solomon Islands and
Tonga as compensation.118
Around the same time, the successful destruction of the Spanish Pacific Squadron in
Manila Bay during the Spanish-American War left the Philippines ripe for the taking. Germany
seemed ready and willing to claim the archipelago if the United States failed to do so itself. The
German Navy and American Navy stood face to face, leading to tense relations between the two
navies, and thus, two countries. When U.S. Marines arrived to occupy the Philippines, however,
the German Navy backed off as the United States annexed the islands.119 These incidents led to
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mutual distrust and war-planning on both sides. In fact, the first five topics of German war-plans
between 1897 and 1898 involved a war with the United States.120
One of these topics, “Operationsplan III” was devised by the German Navy between 1898
and 1906, and provided for German naval attacks against the East Coast and American shipping.
America’s war plan against Germany, War Plan Black, called for the defense of the Western
Hemisphere from German encroachments and a preemption of a German landing somewhere in
the Caribbean, in either Cuba or Puerto Rico. After the defeat of Imperial Germany during the
Great War, however, War Plan Black became obsolete because it was based on the assumption
that Germany would be a major naval power, which it ceased to be after the German High Seas
Fleet was scuttled at Scapa Flow. Were Germany ever to acquire a navy through a new naval
construction program or by treaty from some other power, War Plan Black may have been dusted
off. Such fears were heightened after the Fall of France to Nazi Germany in 1940.121
Ironically, Germany was not the only country that U.S. war planners feared might attempt
to claim French colonial possessions in the Western Hemisphere. A document dated July 5, 1940
and titled “Joint Plan for the Occupation of Martinique and Guadeloupe” spoke of a directive
that was handed down by the Army Chief of Staff and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations to
the Joint Planning Committee. The directive called for a plan to be prepared by the JPC for the
express purpose of intervening in Martinique “to restore order” to “prevent the transfer of the
Sovereignty of MARTINIQUE and GUADELOUPE from FRANCE to GREAT BRITAIN or to
other non-American powers” and to “occupy MARTINIQUE and GUADELOUPE as a trustee
for the AMERICAN REPUBLICS.” The plan notes the scenario “GREAT BRITAIN has
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undertaken to prevent the surrender of FRENCH men-of-war to GERMANY in accordance with
the FRENCH-GERMAN armistice.”122
It continues that the “FRENCH men-of-war are blockaded by probably five BRITISH
cruisers. Others may be en route to the area.” Interestingly the situation continued saying “The
State Department has informed the British Ambassador that any attempt by BRITISH or
CANADIAN Forces to land or take sovereignty of FRENCH possessions in the WESTERN
HEMISPHERE will be considered by the UNITED STATES as an infraction of the Monroe
Doctrine.”123 As the Germans had no Navy to help acquire control over these French territories,
American war planners were more worried that the British or their Canadian allies might attempt
to invade and occupy Martinique and Guadeloupe. Almost one-hundred years after the Polk
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, U.S. war planners invoked the non-transfer provision first
enunciated by President Polk and affirmed by President Grant. The defense of the Monroe
Doctrine thus continued to be a major objective of contingency war-planning.
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CHAPTER II: MANIFEST DESTINY AND MILITARY PLANNING:
Not every contingency plan dealt with small scale interventions by the United States into
other nations. The most detailed contingency plans usually dealt with wars between the United
States and other Great Powers. At the end of the 19th century only one Great Power bordered
upon U.S. territory on the continent of North America, that power was the British Empire. The
historically tense relations between the United States and Great Britain up until the late 19th
made having a contingency war plan against the British a logical necessity. Moreover, the desire
for the United States to be the supreme power in the Western Hemisphere also set the United
States on a potential collision course with the British Empire. While some contiguous U.S.
territory was vulnerable to attack by Great Britain, insular U.S. territory was vulnerable to attack
by Japan. After the elimination of China and Russia as Pacific powers due to their successive
defeats at the hands of Japan, only the United States stood in the way of Japanese supremacy in
the Pacific putting it on a potential collision course with that nation.
Another key concept in U.S. foreign policy at the close of the 19th century in addition to
the Monroe Doctrine which also led to the necessity of American war planning was the concept
of Manifest Destiny, or more generally, American expansionism. In fact, Walter McDougal even
argues that Manifest Destiny was a logical extension of the Monroe Doctrine. McDougal states
that “Keeping the imperial powers out, preventing them from extending their balance-of-power
system to North America’s waters and rimlands, was a vital U.S. interest whether or not it also
led to U.S. expansion. And expansionism, when it did occur, was not identical to the policy of
Monroe Doctrine but a corollary of it.”124 As American expansion and involvement in the world
became more prominent in the late 19th and early 20th century, U.S. leaders came to regard
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certain nations in the Western Hemisphere as obstacles to the extension or growth of American
power and influence. The national interests of a growing United States set in on a potential
collision course with the interests of other countries. The Monroe Doctrine laid the foundation
for Manifest Destiny, as Albert Weinberg argued that "the expansionism of the forties [1840’s]
arose as a defensive effort to forestall the encroachment of Europe in North America."125
In the early to mid-19th century, any empire with a colonial territory in the path of the
United States westward expansion theoretically stood in the way of America’s Manifest Destiny.
For this reason Great Britain, Spain, and France became to be viewed at one time as potential
U.S. enemies. While most of America’s potential enemies were defined well before the Civil
War, America’s military leaders would not begin to develop detailed plans of how to defeat these
powers in a possible war until the 1890s. Also, also during this time period, Manifest Destiny
had been changed by American statesmen from an Ante-Bellum drive for the acquisition of
contiguous territory in North America into a Post-Bellum drive for a new insular empire.126 The
phrase “Manifest Destiny” itself had been coined by the American journalist and diplomat John
Louis O'Sullivan, in support of the annexation of Texas in 1845 when he argued that it was “our
manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of
our yearly multiplying millions.”127 Many Americans, like O’Sullivan, began to dream of a
North America without the “barbarism” of the American Indians, the anarchy of the Mexicans,
or the decaying, aristocratic monarchism of the British. God, they believed, wanted good, hard-
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working white English speaking Protestant Americans to occupy all of the North American
Continent and thus, to some, Manifest Destiny became a divinely ordained mission.128
This idea was not new to this generation of Americans; in fact, it is possible to travel
back to the early days of the Republic to find the first traces of “Manifest Destiny.” In the post
Revolutionary United States, many concerns plagued the young country, and one of those was
whether an extended Republic could survive. James Madison argued that not only could an
extended republic survive, he even suggested that such a Republic could thrive. Essentially
Madison came to argue the point of the larger the better. In a letter to James Madison, Thomas
Jefferson agreed, declaring “we should have such an empire for liberty as she has never surveyed
since the creation: & I am persuaded no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours
for extensive empire & self government."129
As a result of General George Rogers Clark’s Western Campaign in the American
Revolutionary War, the British became convinced that they could not hold the territory of the
Ohio River Valley indefinitely; therefore, they ceded the entirety of what would become the
Northwest Territory to the United States in the Treaty of Paris in 1783.130 Jefferson realized the
importance of this territory when he wrote to Clark saying that “...we shall divert through our
own Country a branch of commerce which the European States have thought worthy of the most
important struggles and sacrifices, and in the event of peace on terms which have been
contemplated by some powers we shall form to the American union a barrier against the
dangerous extension of the British Province of Canada and add to the Empire of liberty an
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extensive and fertile Country thereby converting dangerous Enemies into valuable friends."131
Thus, Jefferson sought to prevent the British from obstructing America’s westward expansion as
they had attempted to do prior to the Revolution. Jefferson also knew that U.S. control over the
navigation of the Mississippi was just as vital to American as obtaining the Ohio River Valley
was necessary for American national security.132
In the aftermath of the Revolution, the U.S. Congress under the Articles of Confederation
passed three ordinances to govern this new territory. The Northwest Ordinance of 1784 simply
stated that the territory was eventually to be separated into 10 different future states. The Land
Ordinance of 1785 outlined the process of the settlement of the Northwest Territory, while the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 established rules for governing the new territory. These ordinances
would serve as an important precedent for the settlement of future U.S. territories.133 The spirit of
these ordinances can also be found in Clauses 1 and 2 of Article 4 of the U.S. Constitution which
establishes guidelines for governing territories belonging to the United States and the admission
of new states to the Union. Though the British presence was largely removed from the Northwest
Territory, the Indian threat in that territory persisted until the successful conclusion of the
Northwest Indian War (1785-1795) and the signing of the Treaty of Greenville (1795).134
Jefferson saw no contradictions between “empire” and “liberty” when he achieved the
purchase of the Louisiana Territory in 1804 for the purpose of adding new states to the Union.135
When he learned of the secret Treaty of San Ildefonso, he became alarmed at the prospect of
having that the Louisiana territory transferred from a weak power like Spain to a strong power
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like France.136 To Jefferson, not only was the U.S. right to the free navigation of the Mississippi
and to the deposit goods at New Orleans at stake, the very balance of power in North America
was as well. As a result, Jefferson had letters leaked to the press which hinted at a possible U.S.
alliance with Great Britain to seize the Louisiana Territory. The usually Anglo-phobic Jefferson
even went so far as to declare that "The day that France takes possession of New Orleans… we
must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation."137 Faced with the prospect of losing all of
the Louisiana Territory with nothing to show for it, Napoleon authorized the sale of not only
New Orleans, but the entire Louisiana Territory for a mere $15 million.138
It was during the “Era of Good Feelings” that American expansion achieved a number of
successes. By the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819, Spain granted territorial rights to the United
States for both East and West Florida.139 Eventually, the territory of West Florida would be
parceled out amongst the Gulf States of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Also according to
the terms of the Treaty, Spain relinquished all of its claims to the Oregon Territory thus leaving
only Russia, Great Britain and the United States as claimants there.140 Another success of the
Monroe administration was the negotiation of the Anglo-American Convention of 1818 which
agreed to establish the 49th parallel as the new border between the United States and British
North America.141 As a result the United Kingdom ceded the territory of the Red River or Selkirk
Colony south of that geographic line and the United States ceded the territory north of the line.
Also in the treaty, the Anglo-American Convention provided for a joint U.S.-U.K. condominium
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over the Oregon Country.142 Although Russia also had claims in Oregon, it ultimately renounced
them in separate treaties with the U.S. and Great Britain in 1824 and 1825 respectively.143
During the Jacksonian Era, expansionism achieved a strong place in the political
discourse and firmly took root in the fabric of the American psyche. Whereas the question of
whether a large extended Republic could survive had largely been answered by this time, some
statesmen now began to ponder whether the Republic could survive if it did not expand. This
became a particularly Jacksonian theme in the Democratic Party.144 Jackson had been important
in his service as a general in the U.S Army, helping to expand the Republic at the expense of
Spain in Florida in 1818-1819 and the Creek Indians in the Southeastern United States in 1814.
Jackson’s Treaty of Fort Jackson during the War of 1812 and his “Indian Removal Act” were
probably the most striking features of his expansionist mindset.145
In keeping with the policies of his predecessor, James K. Polk became perhaps the most
expansion minded president in U.S. History. Polk called for the reoccupation of the Oregon
Territory, from the 42nd parallel of Northern California all the way to the 54th parallel on the
border of Russian Alaska, even if it meant war with Great Britain.146 Polk was aiming for this
goal, but he was content to acquire the Oregon Territory south of the 49th Parallel from the
Continental Divide to the Pacific Ocean.147 Through negotiations with the British, the United
States acquired the territory south of the 49th parallel, including the land that the future states of
Washington, Oregon, Idaho, as well as parts of Montana and Wyoming.148 The Oregon Territory,

142

Nugent, Habits of Empire, 166.
Kluger, Seizing Destiny, 391, 402-404.
144
Thomas R. Hietala, Manifest Design: American Exceptionalism and Empire (New York: Cornell University
Press, 1985), xiii, 109, 262.
145
Ibid., 138.
146
Nugent, Habits of Empire, 178.
147
Kluger, Seizing Destiny, 412-422.
148
Nugent, Habits of Empire, 187.
143

47

however, was not the main goal or concern of the Polk administration, but rather it was the
annexation of Texas and regions beyond.149
The seeds of an American war with Mexico were planted in the 1820s when Americans
began to colonize the Mexican province of Texas at the welcome of Spanish and then Mexican
authorities.150 The Texans eventually revolted and won their independence as a result of the
Texas Revolution in 1836.151 The Lone Star Republic of Texas remained an independent nation
for almost 10 years before finally being annexed to the United States. The annexation of Texas
and the refusal of the Mexican Government to sell either California or New Mexico led to war
between the United States of America and Mexico. The Mexican-American War lasted from
1846 to 1848 and ended in the total defeat of Mexico. Both California and New Mexico fell to
U.S forces early in the war. After Zachary Taylor’s successful invasion of the Northern
provinces of Mexico, and General Winfield Scott’s successful march on Mexico City, the U.S.
flag was hoisted above the capital of a foreign nation for the first time.152 The war ended with the
Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo which acknowledged the United States annexation of all of Texas
up to the Rio Grande, as well as the Mexican Cession which would become the future states of
New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, and California, as well as part of Wyoming.153
The U.S. Civil War serves as a clear division between the Old and New Testaments of
Manifest Destiny. An illustration of this fact can be found in the Crittenden Compromise. In a
desperate attempt to prevent a Civil War, Senator John J. Crittenden of Kentucky offered a
Constitutional amendment which declared that “Slavery would be prohibited in all territory of
the United States "now held, or hereafter acquired," north of latitude 36 degrees, 30 minutes line.
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In territory south of this line, slavery was "hereby recognized" and could not be interfered with
by Congress.” It continued “Furthermore, property in slaves was to be "protected by all the
departments of the territorial government during its continuance." States would be admitted to
the Union from any territory with or without slavery as their constitutions provided” as part of
his Crittenden Compromise. Fearing copycats of William Walker or wars instigated by the South
against the southern neighbors of the United States, Abraham Lincoln shot down this part of the
compromise saying "either the Missouri line extended, or... Pop. Sov. would lose us everything
we gained in the election; that filibustering for all South of us, and making slave states of it,
would follow in spite of us, under either plan" and it "would amount to a perpetual covenant of
war against every people, tribe, and state owning a foot of land between here and Tierra Del
Fuego.” Thus, the era of continental Manifest Destiny was at its end.154
After the U.S.-Mexican War, the United States had no serious rivals remaining among the
various nations of the Western Hemisphere. Also, after the Russo-American Convention of 1824
Great Britain became the only remaining European country to have territory bordering upon the
continental United States. Though the War of 1812 predated the term Manifest Destiny, a desire
for continental expansion among Americans was older than even that contest. Naturally Canada
or British North America became a target of that expansion. While this fact alone would justify
the necessity of U.S. war plans against Great Britain, American aggression against British North
America was not the only cause for conflict between these two countries. Established British
policy toward the United States from colonial times was either containment or dismemberment.
British attempts to block American expansion did not end with the War of 1812,
however, as the British government sought to keep the Floridas out of American hands by
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arming and supplying Indians and freed slaves in Spain’s “derelict” province. When Andrew
Jackson marched into Florida to restore order there, he found two British citizens, Arbuthnot and
Ambister, who had been supplying the tribes which had been attacking U.S. citizens in Georgia
in cross-border raids.155 Florida wound not be the last territory the British wanted to keep out of
American hands. In the late 1830s and early 1840s the British tried to keep the newly created
Republic of Texas independent and out of the Union. The British attempted to enter into a treaty
of alliance and become the guarantor of Texan independence in the decade after the Texan War
of Independence. The Texans ultimately resisted British overtures and entered the Union as a
state in 1845, preceding the Mexican-American War.156
Around the same time, a rebellion against British rule had broken out in Upper Canada
(Ontario) and then Lower Canada (Quebec) which was supported by many Americans across the
border. Some of this support took the form of arms and supplies given to the Canadian rebels by
U.S. citizens. The British almost provoked war with the United States when a Canadian militia
crossed the international boundary into the United States where they attacked and then sunk an
American vessel in the Niagara River.157 The Canadians accused the owner of the vessel of
aiding the rebellion. The unresolved border with British North America in the Northeast was also
a source of tension between the two countries. This border dispute even led to a bloodless war
between American and Canadian loggers called the Aroostook War, named after the valley they
fought over. The dispute was finally settled when Daniel Webster negotiated the Webster-
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Ashburton treaty which settled the border between the U.S. state of Maine and the Canadian
provinces of Quebec and New Brunswick.158
During the Mexican War, another flashpoint in American relations with Great Britain
came during the Oregon Crisis of 1846. Polk, who had been elected President on the campaign
slogan “54’ 40’ or Fight!” was pressured by his position into demanding the entirety of the
Oregon Country from the northern border of California to the southern border of Russian Alaska
at 54’ degrees latitude and 40’ degrees longitude. Already embroiled in a costly war at the time,
Polk took the first opportunity at a fair with the British, with both wanting all of Oregon, but
neither willing to fight for it. After it was suggested that the border established at the 49th parallel
by the Anglo-American Convention of 1818 be extended to the Pacific, Polk submitted a treaty
to this effect to the U.S. Senate without encouraging a Senate vote in favor. The Senate ratified
the treaty but many northern expansionists saw this as a betrayal because Polk, a southerner, was
more than willing to fight to acquire territory adjacent to the Southeastern United States.159
However, Polk’s desire to annex California and the southwest was more about checking the
influence of Great Britain than it was about expanding slavery.160
British intrigues with the Confederacy during the Civil War led to a cooling of relations
between the United States and Great Britain. One flashpoint in the conflict occurred when the
United States intercepted a British vessel, the Trent, The British extension of belligerent rights to
the Confederacy was also viewed as an unfriendly act amounting to a virtual recognition of the
Confederacy by the U.S. State Department under the Lincoln administration. It was suspected
during the war by the U.S. government that the Confederacy was being aided by the British
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government, but the extent was not well known until after the war’s end. The British had been
assisting in building Confederate blockade runners that had wrecked havoc with Union shipping
during the war, decimating the U.S. merchant marine. For compensation a number of Americans
demanded Canada to settle the Alabama Claims as they were called. Inspired by their victory in
the Civil War some U.S. officials even extended an invitation to Canada to join the Union with
the Annexation Bill of 1866.161 The British and the Canadians, nervous about the United States
acquisition of Alaska, its invitation after the war to Canadian provinces to join the Union and the
demands of a few politicians demanding Canada as compensation for the damage done by British
built blockade runners and commerce raiders during the Civil War, led them to create Canada.162
In 1895, few could have foreseen that a rapprochement would occur between the U.S.
and Great Britain within a decade’s time. Especially after U.S. demands to mediate the border
dispute between British Guiana and nation of Venezuela. The dispute led to the First Venezuelan
Crisis where the United States favored Venezuelan boundary claims over the British claims. The
warming of British and American relations began when Great Britain backed the United States
during the Spanish-American War in 1898, as both the British government public supported
Americans taking up the “White Man’s Burden.” An Alaskan-Canadian border dispute was
mediated by a five-man council deciding the claims, the British delegate ruled in favor of the
United States, much to the Canadians chagrin, in an attempt to bring the United States closer to
Great Britain in foreign relations.163
Still, relations between the U.S. and Great Britain would not always be cordial. Tensions
arising over the Venezuelan Debt Crisis in 1902, British violations of international law during
161
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World War I, the illegal British hunger blockade of Germany, and British interference with the
trade of neutrals, were also causes of tension. With the close of the Great War, relations with
Great Britain again cooled. Many American’s resented what they saw as an attempt to commit
American blood and treasure to sustain and defend the United Kingdom’s spoils of war through a
British dominated League of Nation’s which would have given the British Empire, that is Great
Britain and its Dominions, five votes in the League to the United States one vote. America’s
wartime naval construction program continued after the war and sought in time to rival the
strength of the British Royal Navy. Some did worry that such a naval arms race might ignite a
third Anglo-American war just as the naval arms race between Great Britain and Germany had
led to the Great War.164 Some officers in the U.S. Navy made note of the historic British policy
of “crushing any serious challenge to their naval or commercial supremacy.”165
However, at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921, a 10-10-6 ratio was adopted
which provided for 500,000 of tonnage in naval construction for the United States and Great
Britain respectively and 300,000 for Japan. While the ratio provided for parity between the
American and British Navy’s, Japan tolerated the smaller ratio because they had only one ocean
to defend, the Pacific. For the British, the price of naval parity with the United States was the end
of their 20 year alliance with Japan which had begun in 1902.166 Even after the Washington
Naval Conference of 1921, diplomatic relations between the United States and Great Britain
were not always friendly.167 In 1928, issues arising over the debts owed to America by Britain
from the Great War led one prominent British diplomat to assert that “war is not unthinkable

164

Thomas G. Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918-1941
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 135.
165
Mark A. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World
War II (The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 8.
166
LaFeber, The Clash, 128-129.
167
Ibid., 154.

53

between the two countries.”168 Further by 1930 the two countries hovered on the brink of a trade
war as the world depression deepened.169
That same year in the most recent version of War Plan Red-Orange, military planners
noted that “Red (Britain) never hesitated to go to war to maintain its dominance of world trade,”
and a Naval War College study labeled Great Britain as “the greatest economic parasite in the
world.”170 Two years later, future World War II Chief of Naval Operations Ernest J. King
asserted that London “must be considered a potential enemy and a powerful one, not so much as
to questions of security but certainly as to matters involving the growth of our foreign trade,
financial supremacy and our dominant position in world affairs.”171 War Plan Red reflected this
thinking and it continued to be revised until 1938.172 It became standard practice to identify
British dominions with shades of red, hence Canada became Crimson. Even though War Plan
Red was revised multiple times, it nevertheless contained many elements which remained the
same. In such a conflict, a U.S. invasion of Canada would have utilized the U.S. Army in
overland attacks which attempted to take Halifax, Quebec City, and Montreal. A landing of U.S.
Marines to the south of Halifax would assist the Army’s overland invasion from the east. The
seizure of Halifax early on in the conflict was very important to the success of War Plan Red
because it was the only major port on Canada’s east coast by which the British might be able to
bring reinforcements to Canada.173
Meanwhile, a pincer movement to capture the lower peninsula of Ontario would be
implemented by crossing over the Niagara and the St. Clair Rivers, thus linking up the two
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armies in Lower Ontario. These movements would be accompanied by the capture the Sault St.
Marie canals and the cutting of the Canadian Pacific rail line at Winnipeg to prevent any EastWest transfer of Canadian or British troops. On the Pacific Coast, the capture of the cities of
Vancouver, Victoria and Prince Rupert in British Columbia were key objectives. Also, U.S.
naval war planners hoped to whittle down the Royal Navy through commerce raiding and
selected naval attacks in an attempt to force the British government to choose between
committing most of its fleet against the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere, thus leaving it
vulnerable in the North Sea against Germany.174
When fully mobilized, U.S. war planners believed that the United States could force
Great Britain to sue for peace. War Plan Red focused on Canada because it was the only British
target that was within the U.S. capability of striking, with the possible exception of Britain’s
Caribbean possessions. At the very least, holding Canada hostage was seen as a means of forcing
Great Britain to negotiate. After the war though, the United States wished to hold onto Canada as
well as any other British territories that it had captured. 175 War planners noted that if the United
States should fail to win a Blue-Red War, the British and the Canadians may have demanded
Alaska as compensation in the peace treaty. 176 When War Plan Red was declassified in 1974,
Canadians expressed outrage at U.S. war plans designed against their country,177 but unknown to
most Canadians, however, was the fact that Canadian-British War planners had their own war
plans against the United States. Defense Scheme No. 1, as it was known, called for a pre-emptive
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strike against the United States with the object of delaying a U.S advance long enough to secure
a link of reinforcements from Great Britain.178
While the most dangerous potential enemy encountered during the 19th century was the
British Empire, the greatest potential enemy encountered in the early 20th century was less clear
when the century began. The desire for Pacific ports with access to the great markets of Asia,
and China in particular, was a driving force behind the acquisition of California and Oregon in
the 1840s.179 President John Tyler’s ambassador to China, Caleb Cushing, negotiated China’s
first commercial treaty with the United States, the Treaty of Wanghia, in 1844. After this
success, Cushing encouraged President Tyler to attempt to open Japan to Western trade.180 While
this would not happen until the 1850’s, Cushing’s treaty establishing a U.S. role in East Asia
which laid the precedent for Matthew Perry’s voyage to Japan in 1852-1853. Also in the 1850s
the Guano Islands Act of 1856 prepared the way for the United States first insular territories. The
Midway Islands were claimed under the Guano Islands Act in 1859, but were not formally
occupied until 1867.181
In the decades between the Civil War and 1898, a new form of Manifest Destiny
emerged, not one of contiguous expansion, but rather one of overseas empire. Born of many
different factors, most notably of which was the Great Game amongst the various Western
Powers who were then acquiring colonies in Africa and Asia. There were also some uniquely
American motivations like the disappearance of the western frontier, some uniquely Christian
motivations such as spreading the gospel, and finally the commercial motivation for new markets
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for American products.182 The foundations for this new Manifest Destiny, however, were laid
much earlier by Secretary of State William Henry Seward. Secretary of State Seward encouraged
Americans to look beyond the Western Hemisphere where Americans traditionally focused,
arguing that American supremacy in the New World was a foregone conclusion. Seward advised
Americans to set their eyes on the Pacific Rim as the future sphere of American influence.183 As
Seward put it “Who does not see, then, that…the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the
vast regions beyond, will become the chief theatre of events in the world’s great hereafter?”184
The justifications for this new form of American imperialism were supplied by men like Josiah
Strong, John Fiske, John Burgess, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and perhaps most influentially, by
Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge and Albert Beveridge in politics.185
With the domestic and international situation for the United States returned to normal
after the Civil War, various American statesmen sought to reaffirm both the ideas of the Monroe
Doctrine and Manifest Destiny. Seward envisioned a commercial empire instead of a traditional
territorial empire, and therefore saw the need to secure worldwide shipping lanes and open up
corridors of trade. In Seward’s new geo-economic political system, New York City would be the
financial capital of the world and the U.S. dollar would be core currency of a global trading
network. The Pacific Ocean was seen as a future highway of world trade and the need for a transoceanic canal, the acquisition of Hawaii, and to a lesser extent Alaska, were all essential keys to
this new world economic order.186
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At first the United States pursued a very subtle diplomacy after the Civil War. In 1867,
Seward opened into negotiations with Russia in 1867 to purchase Alaska. Alaska was a key to
Seward’s Pacificist policies, as it lay along the “Great Circle” navigation route to the Orient.187
Seward was not alone, for as the borders of the United States reached towards the Pacific Ocean
in search of new ports of access to open up the rumored vast Asian markets to American goods;
many Americans were not content to stop there. To a number of Americans, East Asia became
the Far West and the next logical step of Manifest Destiny. To these Americans the destined call
to go West, which lay deep in the spirit of Western Man, would not end at the Pacific Ocean, but
would now take them to the Far East.188
Seward was not the only influential American to have expressed interest in an American
Empire. Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge once remarked that “From the Rio Grande to
the Arctic Ocean there should be but one flag and one country…”189 Historian John Fiske, in an
essay entitled “Manifest Destiny” declared that “The work which the English race began when it
colonized North America is destined to go on until every land on the earth’s surface that is not
already the seat of an old civilization shall become English in its language, in its religion, in its
political habits and traditions, and to a predominant extent in the blood of its people.”190 Alfred
Thayer Mahan used geo-political arguments for empire in his famous work The Influence of Sea
Power Upon History. Mahan remarked that the nations with the most powerful navies would be
the ones to inherit the earth and build up empires.191 He concluded “Having therefore no foreign
establishments, either colonial or military, the ships of war of the United States, in war, will be
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like land birds, unable to fly far from their own shores. To provide resting-places for them,
where they can coal and repair, would be one of the first duties of a government proposing to
itself the development of the power of the nation at sea.”192
John W. Burgess speculated that Teutonic nations like the United States, Britain and
Germany were “peculiarly endowed with the capacity for establishing national states, and are
especially called to that work; and therefore that they are entrusted, in the general economy of
history, with the mission of conducting the political civilization of the modern world.”193 Albert
J. Beveridge, a friend and supporter of President Theodore Roosevelt agreed when he demanded
the annexation of the Philippines, exclaiming; “God has not been preparing the English-speaking
and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-admiration. No! He
has made us the master organizers of the World to establish system where chaos reigns... He has
made us adepts in government that we may administer government among savage and senile
peoples.”194 The Reverend Josiah Strong asked rhetorically in his famous tract Our Country,
‘Does it not look as if God were not only preparing in our Anglo-Saxon civilization the die with
which to stamp the peoples of the earth, but as if he were massing behind that die the mighty
power with which to press it?”195 William Allen White added that “It is the Anglo-Saxon’s
destiny to go forth as world conqueror. He will take possession of all the islands of the sea. He
will exterminate the peoples he cannot subjugate. This is what fate holds for the chosen people. It
is so written.”196 These men characterized the apostolic zeal that many Americans had for empire
and led the nation into a new imperial phase of Manifest Destiny. Although these men were

192

Zimmerman, First Great Triumph, 99.
Morison, Commager, Leuchtenburg. The Growth of the American Republic, 245.
194
Ferrell, American Diplomacy, 303.
195
Stuart Creighton Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903 (New
Haven, Yale University Press, 1984), 6.
196
Buchanan, A Republic Not An Empire, 164-165.
193

59

opposed by the American Anti-Imperialist League, led by Mark Twain and Andrew Carnegie,
and politicians like Grover Cleveland and William Jennings Bryan, popular and legal approval of
American empire defeated these efforts.197 As the Scramble for Africa came to a close, the only
remaining areas available for colonization lay in Asia. Imperial rivalries in the region would
heighten tensions between the United States and other powers, prompting U.S. war planners to
draft various war plans to deal with these potential enemies.
The dawn of the 20th century would not only be the dawn of the American Century, it
would also be the dawn of the Pacific Century. With the race for empire amongst the Great
Powers of Europe and Japan in Asia drawing to an end, it became apparent to some Americans
that the United States might have to protect its potential investments by the tip of the bayonet.
The rumored East Asian markets were potentially too vast and profitable for U.S. businessmen to
resist and therefore too important to lose. However, in order to access these new markets and to
project its naval power across the great Pacific Ocean, the United States needed friendly ports
and to secure trading routes for the long trip across the seas. During the Age of Steam the need
arose for coaling stations and naval bases among the islands of the Pacific to serve as way
stations to the Far East. One potential island or group of islands for the United States Navy was
the Sandwich or Hawaiian Islands. These islands were already a key outpost for U.S trade in the
Pacific. President William McKinley argued that the acquisition of Hawaii was just as or more
important to American prosperity as the acquisition of California, saying of the former island
kingdom, “It is Manifest Destiny.”198
For many years the United States, Japan, Great Britain, and to a lesser degree Germany
competed for influence on the islands. When Great Britain attempted to make a protectorate of
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the islands in 1843, the United States sent warships to region to prevent it. Secretary of State
James G. Blaine a generation later remarked that the U.S now considered Hawaii to be a vital
part of the “American System”.199 Though there were previous attempts by the United States to
annex the islands, a golden opportunity did not present itself until 1891. Around this time the
native Hawaiians, believing U.S. influence on the islands was becoming too strong, welcomed a
new queen who pledged to eliminate this foreign presence. However, the U.S. sugar planters on
the islands were worried at this turn of events, and in 1893 they deposed Queen Liliuokalani and
established the new Provisional Government of Hawaii.200 U.S marines landed on the island of
Oahu in order to protect the planters and the new government. The American revolutionaries
declared Hawaii to be a republic in 1894 and promptly requested annexation to the United States.
The U.S. government, however, avoided the annexation issue for several years. In 1898, during
the Spanish American War, the United States annexed the Republic of Hawaii by joint resolution
of Congress on July 4 and Hawaii became a U.S territory.201 Notably, Japan was the only country
which protested the American annexation of Hawaii.202
The bridge across the Pacific which began with the acquisition of Hawaii continued with
the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War on December 10, 1898. Under the
terms of the peace treaty with Spain the United States acquired the Philippine Archipelago along
with Guam and Puerto Rico. President McKinley’s message to the U.S. emissaries at the Paris
negotiations stated the American position; “without any desire or design on our part, the war has
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brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great
nation because God has pre-ordained American expansion and responsibilities.”203
The new empire brought new responsibilities.204 During the Spanish-American War, the
United States brought the Filipino rebel leader Emilio Aguinaldo out of exile from Hong Kong to
lead the Filipino insurrection against Spain until additional Marines arrived. When the 12,500
strong U.S. Philippine Expeditionary Force (VIII Corps PE) began to arrive in June, a 15,000
man Spanish army waited in Manila. Filipino insurrectionists, who had taken control of most of
the countryside, surrounded Spanish forces in Manila. On August 13, 1898 the U.S. and Spanish
forces fought the Battle of Manila, which ended with the surrender of the Spanish garrisons.
Fearing a possible German or Japanese takeover of the islands if it should fail to keep the islands,
the United States annexed all 7,108 islands and 7 million inhabitants, as part of the Treaty of
Paris. The United States paid Spain $20 million for the Philippine Archipelago plus Guam and
Puerto Rico and the Senate later ratified the treaty.205 Aguinaldo, however, wanted the
Philippines to become an independent country and thus turned on his former allies.206 Aguinaldo
began an insurrection against the Americans when it became clear that possession of the islands
was just going to be transferred from Spain to the United States. 207 In all practicality, the United
States had little choice. Complete independence was not an option because the Germans and
Japanese stood ready to claim the islands should the United States abandon them. The ensuing
war between U.S. and Philippine forces, the Philippine-American War (1899-1902),208 would
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claim thousands of American and hundreds of thousands of Filipino lives before it was
crushed.209
The Philippine Insurrection was the inspiration behind the drafting of War Plan Brown
and later Special Plan Brown. The Joint Planning Committee was well aware of the tense history
between the Philippine populace and the American occupation forces. The war planners drew up
detailed plans for subduing any possible future rebellion by the Filipino people. The specifics of
the plan called for U.S. forces to hold the capital and bay area of Manila until reinforcements
could arrive.210 Where the reinforcements would come from would be revised multiple times, but
the general idea remained the same. Elements of Plan Brown were useful and relevant for the
defense of Manila in Plan Orange against Japan. However, the U.S. Army and Navy jostled over
the location of a permanent naval base and failed to adequately fortify the islands, including the
area around Manila. Some cautious optimists like Leonard Wood continued to believe that the
islands could be defended against a Japanese attack by using Manila as a redoubt until more
reinforcements could arrive much like versions of Plan Brown. Pessimists like Marine Major
“Pete” Ellis were not so sure, believing that the Philippines could not be held during an invasion
by Japan and had to be abandoned.211
The American presence in the Philippines had been seen by imperialists like Albert
Beveridge as an important link between the United States and the markets of East Asia, in
particular, those of China. U.S. involvement in China dated to late 19th century. In 1899, the
Boxer Uprising broke out in China when Chinese nationalists called Boxers began killing
foreigners and Chinese converts to Christianity. By June 1900, the Boxers had advanced on the
Chinese capital city of Peking, having massacred Chinese Christians on their way there. In
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response to the approaching danger, the Western ministers inside the Legation Quarter in Peking
requested protection.212
The legation guards, which were an international force composed of some 350
experienced soldiers and sailors, including 56 Americans, had to travel 80 miles by rail to beat
the Boxers to Peking. After arriving safely at the Legation Quarter, the guards, along with their
legations, realized that they were surrounded and trapped with no way out, as the Boxers had
destroyed the railroad tracks leading to the city and cut the telegraph lines between the Legation
Quarter and the outside world. For approximately 55 days between June and August 1900, the
Boxers laid siege to the foreign compound inside Peking while simultaneously burning churches
and killing any foreigners they could catch. Foreign missionaries and Chinese Christians flooded
into the Legation Quarter to seek refuge from the Boxers, while some men in the legation went
out to rescue Chinese Christians trapped outside the walls.213
With the multinational compound under attack, a multinational task force had to be
organized to relieve the compound. For his part, President McKinley dispatched 2,500 soldiers
from the U.S. forces stationed in Manila to join the Eight-Nation Alliance.214 The Qing Dynasty
of China responded by declaring war on the eight nations including the United States, but the
U.S. government did not care to reply in kind. The Japanese also joined the multinational force,
but like Russia, it was self-interest that motivated their participation, as they sought to exploit the
situation in China to their advantage. The siege on the compound was lifted on August 15, 1900.
In the aftermath of the uprising, many of the governments involved in relieving the siege
demanded concessions from the complacent Qing Dynasty. Even President McKinley sought to

212

Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, 74-75.
Ibid., 99.
214
Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2000), 46-50.
213

64

acquire a lease on Samsah Bay in China’s Fukien province, but he was talked out of it by
Secretary of State John Hay who advocated an Open Door policy for China instead.215
U.S. war planners drafted War Plan Yellow to deal with the possibility of a future
uprising against U.S. citizens in China. The U.S. military’s China Relief Expedition of 1900
served as the direct inspiration behind War Plan Yellow and Special Plan Yellow. By the early
1920s there were some 300 American businesses and 7,000 U.S. citizens living in China, many
of those being missionaries. As a result of the Boxer Protocol signed by the Chinese government
and the members of the Eight-Nation Alliance in 1901, the United States reserved the right to
keep troops stationed in China to protect the legations at Peking and to guard the rail lines
between Peking and the Chinese coast. The U.S. Navy was also permitted to maintain a few
gunboats on the Yangtze River.216
China in the 1920s was one torn by civil war and divided between various warlords
spread throughout the country. In addition, the Soviet armed and organized Kuomintang (KMT)
Army began advancing in the North, causing some apprehension amongst Western governments.
Since the KMT had been calling for the abolition of special privileges and extra-territorial rights
for Westerners, the United States government and military officials had good reason to fear the
outbreak of more anti-Western, anti-American violence. In response to these threats war planners
drew up War Plan Yellow. The plan called for an expedition similar to the one launched in 1900,
except that the U.S. was willing to perform unilateral operations. Under the plan the U.S.
military would reinforce the legations, sending in larger forces drawn from units redeployed
from the Philippines, Hawaii or the states.217
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In January 1927, rising tensions with the Kuomintang, anti-foreign sentiment in
Shanghai, and continued fighting between the warlords in North China led to the creation of
Special Plan Yellow. Special Plan Yellow dealt with two possible contingencies. One was a U.S.
response to any violation of the 1901 protocol and the other to a violation of the protocol
accompanied by anti-foreign violence. Variation A dealt with anti-western violence in Shanghai
while Variation B dealt with similar violence in various port cities targeted by anti-western
elements. U.S. forces would be there to protect their fellow citizens and other westerners
threatened by violence, not to take sides in any conflict among the warlords or to engage the
KMT. War planners did not consider occupation of all of China to be realistic or rounding up all
anti-foreign Chinese as reasonable. Thus, U.S. forces had a limited mission under War Plan
Yellow. Plan Yellow remained in effect throughout the 1930s, but ceased to be relevant when
U.S. forces were redeployed to the Philippines in 1941. Plan Yellow was essentially defunct by
the time World War II broke out in Asia.218
Direct U.S involvement with Japan could be traced back to 1853, when Commodore
Matthew Perry sailed into Tokyo Bay to open Japan to U.S. trade. Little did Perry know that one
hundred years later the United States would finally be restoring sovereignty to the Japanese after
a seven year occupation and a bloody four year Pacific War.219 Upon returning from his voyage
Commodore Perry urged U.S. annexation of the then future Japanese territories of Formosa and
the Ryukyu Islands, the latter of which contained the strategic island of Okinawa.220 A clash over
Hawaii in 1897 between the United States and Japan, stemming from Japanese resentment over
White Hawaiian treatment of the Japanese Hawaiian population and rumors of possible U.S.
annexation of the islands, led to a diplomatic crisis between the two countries. Eventually Japan
218
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backed down, but both powers sent warships to the region.221 During the scramble for China
among the Great Powers after the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, the United States sought to join the
scramble by acquiring Samsah Bay in Fukien Province. Due to diplomatic protests by the
Japanese, who coveted the province for its close proximity to the new Japanese colony of
Formosa, recently acquired during the first Sino-Japanese War, and John Hay’s alternative policy
of the Open Door, McKinley backed off. 222
During the Russo-Japanese War the U.S. government initially tilted toward Japan, but as
the war progressed it began to worry that the Japanese might become too strong at the expense of
Russia, prompting President Roosevelt to help negotiate the Treaty of Portsmouth ending the war
in 1905.223 Japan’s unsatisfactory gains soon aroused resentment over American involvement.224
Also in 1905, the Taft-Katsura Agreement gained Japanese acknowledgement of an U.S. sphere
of influence in the Philippines in exchange for U.S. acknowledgement of a Japanese sphere of
influence in Korea. After this agreement, however, Japanese-American relations steadily
declined after a California school board ordered the segregation of Japanese students from whites
in 1906. A number of Japanese newspapers demanded that warships be sent to California. Such
talk led President Roosevelt to inquire about War Plan Orange. 225 A so-called Gentleman’s
Agreement in 1907, however, ended the crisis between the United States and Japanese
governments, resulting in a revocation of the segregation order and a Japanese promise to restrict
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Japanese immigration to the United States.226 Still, Theodore Roosevelt sent the Great White
Fleet to Japan to show U.S strength on its trip around the world from 1907 to 1909.227
Most U.S. disagreements with Japan after 1908 revolved around China, in particular, the
rich Chinese province of Manchuria. The Japanese tried to close the Open Door in Manchuria on
numerous occasions, most notably in 1905 and 1909.228 The Japanese gradually acquired firmer
control over Manchuria from Russia and China, and then slowly began closing the Open Door on
the rest of China. The Japanese signed a new agreement with Russia in 1907, whereby the
Russians recognized Japanese “special interests” in southern Manchuria and Korea while the
Japanese recognized Russian “special interests” in northern Manchuria and Outer Mongolia.229
When World War I broke out in 1914, Japan took advantage of the conflict in Europe by seizing
the German Pacific Island territories of the Caroline, Marianna, and Marshall Islands, as well as
Germany’s Chinese concessions on the Shantung Peninsula of China.230 These minor conquests
placed the Japanese astride U.S supply lines to the Philippines, seriously impairing any future
implementation of War Plan Orange. Also during the First World War, Japan took advantage of
the preoccupation of the Great Powers in Europe by attempting to make a protectorate out of all
of China with the Twenty-One Demands. Pressure from the U.S. and Great Britain caused them
to back down on their most severe demands.231
In 1921, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes pressured the government of Great
Britain not to renew its 20-year old alliance with Japan at the Washington Naval Conference.
Hughes informed the British that re-ratification of the treaty would be interpreted by the United
226
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States as an alliance directed against the United States.232 The United States also succeeded in
convincing the Japanese to accept a smaller ratio of tonnage for their fleet than the United States
and Great Britain. By the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty, the United States and Great
Britain were each allowed 525,000 tons respectively for their navies while the Japanese were
allowed 315,000 for theirs. As an incentive to the Japanese, the U.S. promised not to fortify its
possessions in the Western Pacific.233 This promise would have major implications for the
effectiveness of War Plan Orange by virtually ensuring that an abandonment of the Philippines
and Guam would occur after the outbreak of hostilities with Japan.234 This was especially the
case after the Great War because Japan’s wartime conquests; the Marshalls, Marianas and
Carolines, lay astride U.S. supply lines to its overseas possessions in the Philippines and
Guam.235 As the General Board wrote after the conference, in “its opinion… the naval situation
of the United States in the Pacific, both as to ships and as to bases, resulting from the Treaty for
the Limitation of Naval Armament as greatly to lessen the power of the United States to prepare
to defend its interests or unaided to enforce its policies in the western Pacific…”236
When Henry Cabot Lodge pondered the thought of a U.S.-Japanese War after the
Washington Conference he remarked that there was “not the slightest danger” of a U.S. war with
Japan, “if Japan understands that she cannot get control of the Pacific.”237 Lodge was not alone
in expressing his belief that Japan must not be allowed to dominate the Western Pacific. Such
thinking had permeated Republican statesmen since Seward, who demanded that “the simple
people of Japan” be made to respect “the institutions of Christianity.” According to Seward’s
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biographer, the former Secretary of State warned of a “holy war” between the Christian West and
the Japanese, if the latter moved against Christians, they would “only prepare the way for fearful
and blooding convulsions.”238 Ultimately, however, it was not religious persecution but Japanese
actions in China and Southeast Asia which finally led to a war between the two countries. The
1919 version of War Plan Orange correctly predicted that this would probably be the case
concluding that while Japan did not pose a threat to the U.S. mainland, it could close the Open
Door or threaten Southeast Asia, including the Philippines. For the remainder of the 1920s, the
United States and Japan would continue to clash over China.239
Given the Japanese Empire’s proximity to American possessions in the Pacific and past
disagreements, War Plan Orange also made sense.240 Though also revised many times, almost all
of War Plan Orange contained three phases in an overall strategy to defeat Japan. In Phase I,
Japan would attack and most likely overrun U.S. possessions in the Pacific. In Phase II, the U.S.
Navy and an Army expeditionary force would advance to the Far East via the Central Pacific
across the Japanese mandated islands, develop a base, secure U.S. supply lines and then sever
Japanese trade with all regions except northeastern Asia, and gather strength for Phase III. In
Phase III, U.S. forces would advance northward through the islands paralleling the coast of Asia,
drawing nearer to Japan, starving it of fuel, food, and raw materials by blockade and bombard
essential targets on the Japanese coast. In 1924, Commander R.B. Coffey remarked “An Orange
War (War with Japan) is considered the most probable. It is by far the most difficult for the
Navy. It will require the greatest maritime effort yet made by any nation.”241 Coffey’s words
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would be prophetic. The siege of Japan would be altered over time as air power was developed
and the consideration of an invasion would not appear until late in the Second World War.242
The nightmare scenario for U.S. war planners, however, was fighting America’s greatest
potential European enemy, the British Empire, and its greatest Asian enemy, the Japanese. Ever
since the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been signed in 1902, fears of a possible Anglo-Japanese
war against the United States troubled war planners. Although the Treaty of 1902 only pledged
the assistance of one of the signatories should the other be attacked by a third party while at war,
that did not prevent the British and the Japanese from using their alliance divide the German
Empire in the Pacific during World War I. While the U.S. Fleet continued to grow for a time
after the Great War as a result of the Naval Act of 1916, it would still have had trouble fighting
the greatest fleets in the world. This contingency was the one that U.S. war planners worried
about the most. Despite the difficulties envisioned in such a conflict, war planners developed
War Plan Red-Orange to deal with this potential conflict. As it suggests, the war plan combined
both elements of Red and Orange. 243
The land operations of War Plan Red-Orange were the same as War Plan Red, but the
naval operations were vastly different. In the event of War Plan Red, the bulk of the U.S. Navy
was to be shifted from the Pacific to the Atlantic while leaving a smaller defensive force behind.
In War Plan Orange the bulk of the U.S. Navy was to be shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific
leaving a smaller defensive force behind. In War Plan Red-Orange the bulk of the U.S. Navy was
to be shifted to the Atlantic to deal with the British Navy first. Upon the conclusion of hostilities
with Great Britain, the Navy would shift most of its force to the Pacific to defeat Japan. While
the U.S. Asiatic Fleet concentrated in Manila Bay to meet a Japanese invasion of the Philippines,
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a smaller Pacific force would be stationed off the West Coast of the United States to interdict any
possible Japanese landing in Vancouver or Prince Rupert in British Columbia.244
The Europe-first or Atlantic-first policy of War Plan Red Orange was not new to U.S.
war plans. In fact, this concept dates as far back as 1897, when war planners drafted a plan which
called for a hypothetical war between the United States on one side and Japan and Spain on the
other. The U.S. Navy was to focus on the Atlantic first, defeat the European opponent, and then
face Japan. This Europe-first policy implied that a defensive strategy would be taken in the
Pacific, but this became problematic after the U.S. acquired possessions nearer to Japan than
they were to the United States. The rationale for this policy was that the American Eastern seaboard was closer to Europe than the American West Coast was to Japan, and that trans-Atlantic
trade at the time as more important than trans-Pacific trade. The idea behind two-ocean war
would not change but would be adapted to meet other circumstances when World War II broke
out in the Pacific.245
The war plans drafted by U.S. military planners were based on real threats to the United
States drawn from American history. Having a detailed war plan for Great Britain made sense if
one considered the long and storied past of U.S.-British diplomatic relations. Over the previous
165 years prior to the Second World War, relations between the two countries contained more
cooling periods than warm ones. Having a war plan against Japan was also logical. Ever since
the United States opened up Japan to trade by compulsion in 1854 U.S. relations with Japan
could hardly ever have been called good. Even as technical Allies, during World War I Japan’s
activities in China provoked American suspicion and hostility. War plans for dealing with an
insurrection in the Philippines or a rebellion in China were logical exercises for the military,
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whose men were already committed in these areas to uphold American authority and rights. The
utility of U.S. war planning contained more than just practical responses to potential conflicts.
These war plans were also useful training exercises for officers and for their adaptability to the
changing international situation.

73

CHAPTER III: THE EVOLUTION OF RAINBOW FIVE
It would not be until the 1930s that the United States departed from its historical war
planning strategies of color coded plans based on the defense of the Western Hemisphere and
U.S. overseas possessions in favor of multi-colored Rainbow Plans made up of scenarios which
included multiple enemies and allies.246 While not perfectly implemented during World War
II,247 War Plan Orange was still the most utilized of all the previous color-coded war plans.248 In
fact, the Pacific Ocean Areas command under the command of Chester A. Nimitz was nearly the
exact route of the conquest planned in War Plan Orange, albeit with some minor alterations.249 In
the decade which preceded the United States entry into World War II, the Army War College
polished and improved the previously written color plans and added a new feature of scenarios
which included coalition warfare. These improvements laid the initial groundwork for the
Rainbow plans and ultimately their final version, Rainbow Five.
Until recently, many military historians have doubted the relevance of America’s color
coded war plans and worse, they have even tried to deny that any link between those war plans
and the more famous Rainbow plans ever existed. Maurice Matloff, author of Strategic Planning
for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, asserted in 1975 that the “quickening environment”250 of the
late 1930s and early 1940s inspired the Rainbow Plans and that the pre-1939-1941 “plans
envisaged neither global nor total war.”251 However, Henry Gole demonstrated in his 2003 The
Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934-1940, that there existed a clear
continuity between America’s earlier color-coded war plans and the successor Rainbow plans
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developed by the Joint Board and the Joint Planning Committee. In 1957, twenty five foot
lockers full of course materials dated 1919-1940 were discovered in the basement and attic of the
Army War College (AWC) at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. After examining evidence that
was unavailable to the authors of the so-called “Green Books”252, the official military histories of
the Second World War, Gole found convincing proof of an intermediate stage between the older
color plans and the Rainbow plans which would be developed in the late 1930’s and 1940’s. 253
As the decade of the 1930s saw an increasingly volatile international situation develop,
students attending the Army War College observed an ever changing world and revised old plans
and drafted new war plans to deal with potential crises. This practice was nothing new to the
various officers who taught at the Army War College, but a new feature was added by AWC
commandant Major General George S. Simmonds to the curriculum in addition to the revisions
of older color plans like Orange, Red or Green. This new exercise was called “Participation with
Allies.”254 Previously, war plans had focused on a potential conflict between Blue (the United
States) and any number of potential enemies. “Participation with Allies” added a new dimension
to the older war plans, in that instead of presuming the United States was fighting alone against
its old potential enemies, It envisioned the U.S. engaged in a cooperative effort with other
powers. As a reflection of recent current events, the first installment in “Participation with
Allies” was a Pacific War scenario. This scenario reflected the heightened tensions at the time
between Japan and the powers opposed to its expansion into China.255
In the 1934 “War with Japan” scenario, Blue (United States), Pink (Russia), Red
(Britain), and Yellow (China) were engaged in a war with Orange (Japan) and Carnation
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(Manchukuo).256 On September 19, 1931 Imperial Japan invaded Manchuria in Northern China
and set up a new puppet state called Manchukuo.257 The scenario created by war planners in
1934 envisioned that Japan and the Soviet Union were already engaged in continuous clashes on
the northern border of Manchuria. Cooling relations between the United States and Japan
occurred after an incident reminiscent of the 1937 attack on the U.S.S. Panay. Although Japan
and the Soviet Union were not technically at war in this scenario, the situation threatened to
break out into open warfare. The United States, despite bad relations with Japan and suspicion of
the Soviet Union, sought to arbitrate the dispute between the two powers. War planners expected
the Japanese to reject arbitration and the Soviets to participate. 258
The arbitration conference between the United States, Great Britain, China, and the
Soviet Union eventually developed into an Inter-Allied War Council which finally declared war
on Japan after some un-described international incident.259 In such a war, U.S. war planners
expected Japan to attack and seize the Philippines early on in the conflict due to Japan’s initial
local superiority, which Captain Dudley W. Knox blamed on the Washington Naval Conference
which forsook “all chances of defending the Philippines.”260 There were two options available to
the United States according to war planners in a war against Japan. The first option was to force
a decisive naval battle with the Japanese in pure Mahanian fashion, but with no local naval base
to provide sanctuary or repairs this was a risky option, especially when one considered the
expected Japanese attempt to whittle down the U.S. fleet en route to the region.261 The second
option consisted of a slow, deliberate effort to capture the Japanese mandated islands for advance
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bases en route to the Philippines. This second option was reminiscent of the actual island
hopping campaigns of World War II. The second option was safer, but it required a greater effort
by land forces.262
The objectives of each member of the Inter-Allied War Council were realistic. Both Great
Britain and the Soviet Union wanted to see Japanese power in the Far East reduced, while China
wanted to see Japanese forces out of China and the return of its lost territory of Manchuria. The
United States also sought to prevent Japanese or Russian domination of Asia and further wished
to uphold the territorial integrity of China.263 U.S. war planners did not believe that a punitive
peace would be advantageous to U.S. interests. Instead war planners foresaw a significantly
demilitarized but still economically strong Japan that could help stave off Soviet domination of
Asia.264 The accuracy of war planners compared to eventual U.S. post-war foreign policy in Asia
in this respect is quite remarkable.265 The only aspect of this particular scenario that did not
parallel the actual conduct of the Second World War was war planner’s expectation of a greater
contribution by the Royal Navy in the Far East;266 however, this was a logical expectation
because the 1935 scenario did not envision a simultaneous war in Europe.267
The 1935 scenario “The Nazi Confederation” saw the first attempt by war planners to
deal with a two-ocean war involving a close cooperation with Allies. The 1935 scenario placed
the United States on the side of Great Britain, France, and Italy against an enemy coalition which
consisted of Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, which AWC war planners called the
“Nazi Confederation.”268 The scenario envisioned a coup d’état whereby the Nazi’s came to
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power in Austria and concluded an economic and political pact with Germany. Italy reacted to
these events by seizing various mountain passes on its border with Austria as well as two
strategic Austrian towns. 269 A Nazi inspired revolt by ethnic Germans in the Italian Tyrol was
followed by German and Austrian declarations of war on Italy, France responded by occupying
the Saar region and by seizing the Rhineland of Germany. Italy then invaded Albania to secure
Italian control of the Adriatic while the Kingdom of Yugoslavia mobilized, allying itself with
Germany and Austria. The Yugoslavs ceded some territory to Hungary in return for Nazi
promises of Albania and some Italian territory. The Hungarians then take advantage of the
situation by allying with Germany, Austria and Yugoslavia, and invading Czechoslovakia. Also,
Germany backed a Ukrainian revolt to keep the Soviet Union preoccupied and out of the war.270
Meanwhile, in the Far East, Japan built up its forces in Manchuria and demanded a free
hand in China from the Western Powers as well as the cessation of British fortifications of Hong
Kong and Singapore.271 Also, the Japanese declared that any movement of U.S. naval forces west
of Midway would be considered an act of war by Japan.272 Japan quarantined the Yellow Sea and
Sea of Japan and after the outright Japanese annexation of the mandated islands, Australia and
New Zealand pressure Great Britain to cooperate with the United States in a policy of armed
neutrality in the Pacific.273 After an incident in which American and British ships in port were
attacked in France by Nazi forces, the United States and Great Britain declared war on the Nazi
Confederation.274 War planners stated the United States would deal with the Nazi Confederation
first, even if Japan initiated hostilities, and that the objectives in such a conflict were to prevent
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Nazi hegemony in Europe and Japanese hegemony is East Asia. A small U.S. expeditionary
force was anticipated to contribute to the war in Europe, but the main U.S. effort, both naval and
land would be in the Pacific.275
The 1935 scenario, like the previous year, was prescient in that it accurately forecasted
U.S. public opinion in its opposition to any American involvement in another European war.
U.S. war planners anticipated legislation similar to the Neutrality Acts passed by Congress in the
late 1930s when a European War actually broke out. While many aspects of the 1935 scenario
did occur in the real continuity of events and the conduct of war, there were aspects that departed
from the real-time world war scenario. Italy did not join the Allies during World War II. Another
aspect of the scenario which did not materialize during the Second World War was Yugoslavia
as an Axis ally.276 While U.S war planners were generally correct in their prediction that a
Second World War would be precipitated by revisionist powers, Yugoslavia would not be one of
them.277
In 1936, a new innovation was added to the curriculum by the G-2 (intelligence) staff at
the AWC called Foreign News.278 The responsibility of those individuals assigned to this class
was to keep up with various current events and to adjust potential scenarios to reflect those
changes. The addition of this new course was reflected in the 1936 scenario entitled “The Central
Coalition” which had Italy and Yugoslavia exchange places as Allied and Axis belligerents. Italy
moved from the Allied to the Axis camp because of the Italian Conquest of Ethiopia which
occurred during the course of 1936.279 Since Italy had historically bad relations with the
relatively new Kingdom of Yugoslavia, planners did not have to stretch their imaginations too
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far to predict that whatever side Italy or Yugoslavia found themselves on, the next European war
would find them on opposite sides.280
Initially, the Central Coalition would have been made up of Germany, Austria, Italy and
Hungary. After a declaration of war by the United States in response to the Central Coalition’s
hostile acts, the Allied camp would consist of Great Britain, France, Turkey and the United
States.281 When the war began, British and French forces on the Rhine, poised for an invasion of
Germany, while German forces were poised for an invasion of Czechoslovakia. Austria and
Hungary were poised to invade Yugoslavia and Romania. The British Commonwealth gave
moral support to Great Britain, but only Canada was willing to send troops to fight in Europe.
Australia and New Zealand were too concerned that the Japanese would take advantage of the
distractions in Europe to launch a Pacific War.282 The Soviet Union responded to these fears by
mobilizing as Soviet policy tilts toward the Allies as does that of Yugoslavia, Romania and
Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, Poland and Bulgaria tilted toward the Central Coalition.283
U.S. war aims according to the student committee were to restore peaceful relations on
favorable terms to the United States and consistent with a durable peace that was “conducive to
international political and economic stability.”284 War planners made it very clear that the United
States would not tolerate any peace which left allied powers economically dominant over enemy
coalition partners. The actual plans for allied victory differed from the previous year’s scenario
in that U.S. war planners assigned more ground forces to Europe, while still leaving most U.S.
naval power in the Pacific to deal with an eventual Japanese attack.285 In addition to an eventual
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Japanese attack, planners expected the Central Coalition to invade Czechoslovakia and Romania
in order to seize their resources.286 The mission of U.S. ground forces in Europe was to support
an allied invasion of Germany, while the mission of U.S. naval forces in the Atlantic was to
protect allied convoys.287 The mission of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific was to protect sea lanes,
and the mission of the U.S. Army on the West Coast was to remain on standby should the
Japanese attack or should there be other more pressing developments in Western Hemisphere.288
While war planners were off about a German alliance with Poland, one could only fault
them so much for their miscalculation, as the German-Polish non-aggression pact of 1934 was
still fresh in their minds.289 War planners’ expectations that the Allies would have a foothold in
Germany and that they would be able to attack from the Rhineland were also off, but Germany
would only remilitarize the Rhineland later that year.290 Also, very few war planners could have
predicted the rapid Fall of France with accuracy. The greatest prediction of war planners in the
1936 scenario was the expectation that the British would cede the bulk of the Allied war effort in
the Pacific to the United States. Also important to note in the 1936 scenario was the adoption of
a Germany-first or European-first strategy.
The 1937 scenario, entitled “Europe and the Pacific” pitted Germany, Poland, Italy,
Austria, Hungary, Albania, Greece, Turkey, and Japan against France, the Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia, Romania, and after some unfriendly acts, the United States and the British
Commonwealth of Nations.291 Very early on in this scenario the German led coalition overran
Czechoslovakia, all of Romania and half of Yugoslavia in Eastern Europe, after Soviet and
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Romanian troops attacked Hungary. Meanwhile, French forces stood alone against German and
Italian troops in Western Europe.292 Also, the Soviet Union and Japan were fighting in Asia, but
the Japanese turned south in an attempt to establish control over China. The Japanese also
attempted to take control of European colonial possessions in the Pacific, forcing the British to
divert much of their fleet to operations there.293 Paradoxically, the United States assumed
responsibility over naval operations in the Mediterranean. These were some obvious flaws with
the 1937 scenario.294 Other miscalculations included Poland, Greece and Turkey as German
allies, and Romania as an ally of the Soviet Union and the Western Democracies.
War planners surmised the German-led coalition’s options as one of the following; the
first was to take offensive action in the east while remaining in a defensive position in the west
against France.295 German forces would attempt to contain France, while their forces in the east
crushed Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, Romanian forces before continuing east against the Soviets,
while the Japanese attacked the Soviet Union from the east. The rationale behind such a strategy
was that it was necessary in order to acquire valuable Czech, Romanian and Soviet resources at
an early stage in the war.296 The second course of action predicted by war planners consisted of
three separate stages; the first phase was a rapid conquest of France, the second phase was an air
and naval campaign against Great Britain, and the third phase was a combined offensive against
the Soviet Union in conjunction with Japan.297 War planners then focused on the possible
courses of action available to Allied forces.
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War planners proposed taking the offensive in the Pacific while remaining on the
defensive in Europe. The second course of action was to reinforce the British fleet in the Pacific
and to conduct offensive operations in Europe. A key objective to U.S. war planners was to keep
the Soviet Union in the war. To help relieve pressure on Soviet forces, war planners proposed an
allied invasion of Italy which would be followed by an invasion of the Balkans via Italy. This
Mediterranean Offensive would be conducted simultaneously with the Pacific Offensive and its
other object would be to isolate Turkey and ensure Allied naval control of the Mediterranean.
The Mediterranean Offensive was abandoned as too costly in terms of men and material.
Interestingly enough, the United States would adopt a similar strategy during the Second World
War. Of the two strategies proposed, U.S. war planners would once again adopt a Europe first.298
As with the other scenarios, there were some estimations by student war planners which were
off. For example, Romania would not be associated with the Allies during World War II.299
After the Munich Conference, a strategic study concluded by the Joint Board in 1938
examined the possibility of a violation of the Monroe Doctrine by one or more of the Fascist
powers.300 The Joint Board requested that the Joint Planning Committee make exploratory
studies and estimates on what course of action should be taken by the United States if one or
more of the Fascist powers violated the Monroe Doctrine, and if Japan attempted to extend its
control over the Philippines.301 The Joint Planning Committee returned with its findings and
stated that it had “considered that any pertinent aspect of the situation, in the Atlantic or Pacific,
of a character that would throw light on the situation as a whole, as envisaged by the directive (of
the Joint Board), should be explored.” These “situations” were contingencies the United States
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might encounter during the course of an ongoing conflict. The JPC noted “that the timing of
initial unfriendly acts, in the Atlantic and in the Pacific, might not be simultaneous, and that in
fact they probably would not be.” They also stated that the purpose of the studies initiated by the
request of the Joint Board was “to clarify and delineate possible situations that would or might
lead to concerted aggression in the Western Atlantic and Western Pacific” and further, to
indicate “the preparatory actions that could be taken by the United States to forestall or minimize
the adverse situations” and “provide for plans and decisions for the actions to be taken by the
United States when confronted by the threat or actual armed aggression…” Planners understood
“that the threat might be isolated or it might be a prelude to the concerted threat contemplated by
the directive.” As such, the United States must be prepared for any contingency.302
The Joint Planning Committee’s study contained several key assumptions, one of which
was that Germany, Italy and Japan may be joined in alliance, that the action of any one or two of
these three Fascist powers would most likely receive the sympathetic support of the others, and
that the democratic powers would remain neutral as long as their own possessions in the Western
Hemisphere were left alone. The committee anticipated a possible Japanese attack on, as well as
the probable conquest of the Philippines and Guam, while both Germany and Italy sought to
acquire bases in the Atlantic from Spain and/or Portugal in the Azores, the Canaries and/or Cape
Verde Islands, as well as bases in any Spanish and Portuguese West African possessions that
they could establish their influence over. From there, Germany and Italy might attempt to foment
fascist style revolutions in Latin America, particularly in those countries with large German or
Italian émigré populations like Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Following this, the Fascist powers
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might try and move troops and aircraft into those fascist dominated South American countries. In
the event of this happening, War Plan Violet or Purple would have to be implemented.303
If the Axis powers were successful, then they might have been able to threaten the
Panama Canal and U.S. possessions in the Caribbean, or even worse, establish control over the
countries located in this region. If this situation occurred, War Plan Tan, War Plan Gray, or even
War Plan Green would most likely have had to been implemented. To prevent any possible
German and Italian aggression in the Western Hemisphere, the United States planned to
concentrate a battle fleet off of the Azores Islands in order to challenge any attempted Axis
control of the seas. Such a scenario, however, presumed that the Axis powers would have a naval
capability that would enable them to extend their influence into the Western Hemisphere.304
Since neither Germany nor Italy had fleets capable of projecting naval power across the
Atlantic, War Plan Red and War Plan Black, as they pertained to the status of British, French,
and even Dutch colonial possessions falling into German hands would not be implemented by
the United States. Presumably, those plans would not have been implemented unless the Allies
fell and their fleets were turned over to the Axis powers. Also, in the event that either Portugal or
Spain cooperated with the Axis powers of Germany and Italy, the U.S. Army would organize an
expeditionary force to seize Portuguese and Spanish possessions in West Africa. Finally, the
military would prepare an expeditionary force to seize the city of Natal in Brazil to preclude the
establishment of any enemy presence there. In the Pacific Theater, War Plan Orange would have
been implemented after the defeat of Germany and Italy. This Europe-first strategy was
consistent with previously established war planning.305
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Interestingly enough, the war plans developed at the Army War College from 1938
onward reflected the considerations made in the report of the Joint Planning Committee.306 The
faculty at the Army War College instructed students to draft plans for an army-navy expedition
to South America “under the rubric Participation with Allies.”307 Evidently, the War Plans
Division of the War Department and the Army War College turned the “Participation with
Allies” exercise into a drawing board for the development of war plans dealing with various
contingencies under consideration by the Joint Board. The staff at the Army War College
resurrected War Plan Violet, renaming it War Plan Purple. In the war plan, planners referred to
South America broadly as Purple. The bulk of war planning exercises dedicated to Purple dealt
with mobilization exercises, but some others dealt with “Frontier Defense and Joint Overseas
Expeditions” and yet others with “Overseas Possessions and Their Influence on the Strategic
Position of Mother Countries in War.”308
Along with the development of War Plan Purple, war planners reconsidered War Plan
Orange. Among the considerations made by U.S. war planners were the possible courses of
action available to Japan. War planners ruled out a Japanese offensive into the South Pacific
because planners felt that it would be too difficult for the Japanese to sustain such an offensive
without a presence in Hawaii. Instead, war planners envisioned a Japanese conquest of Guam
and the Philippines followed by a strategic defensive and a war of attrition. Planners evaluated
the Japanese military as first rate and predicted initial Japanese resources to be greater than the
U.S. in the Western Pacific, rendering an initial U.S. naval presence in the region too risky. U.S.
war planners made note of the long-term American advantages in such a war, and they believed
those advantages would compensate for any initial deficiency in material needs as the war
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progressed. After about a year of Japanese superiority in the Pacific, the United States would
begin to dominate.309 The U.S. Army estimated that the war with Japan would last 3 years, while
the Navy estimated it would last 4 years.310 According to the student planners, Japanese aims
were to dominate East Asia, lead an Asia for Asians, expand Japanese economic and military
influence, and obtain recognition of racial equality and prestige for all Japanese.311 U.S. aims
were simply to maintain the status quo in the Far East and to protect American interests there.
Given the conflicting aims stated by war planners, it is no wonder that war planners believed war
between the United States and Japan to be inevitable.312
The 1939 scenario under “Participation with Allies” also focused on War Plan Orange
and War Plan Purple. The 1939 version of War Plan Orange at the Army War College, however,
benefitted from the presence of naval officers at the college. The group studying the role of the
Philippines in a future conflict against Japan again, not surprisingly, concluded the Philippines
would be lost early in the war. Student war planners also expected the Japanese to attack without
a declaration of war. In addition, war planners expected the Japanese to establish bases in the
Caroline, and the Marshall Islands if they had not done so already, and to seize new bases in the
Aleutians. War planners believed that the Japanese would organize a strategic defense perimeter
consisting of the Aleutians, the Caroline, and the Marshall islands. U.S. military authorities also
believed that the Japanese would “employ naval attrition tactics”313 from their advance bases in
an attempt to whittle down U.S. forces prior to a decisive naval engagement with U.S. forces.314
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In order the counter this strategy, U.S. war planners advised a step-by-step campaign
across the Pacific which sought to secure advance bases for U.S. forces in route to Guam and the
Philippines. In the process, the Japanese fleet would be defeated and Japanese commerce would
be destroyed as U.S. naval forces tightened their naval blockade around Japan. Although U.S.
war planners wished to avoid a long war, they realized that a deliberate step-by-step strategy was
necessary in order for the U.S. to secure communications and supply lines while avoiding any
unnecessary risks in the process. The Japanese strategy predicted by U.S. war planners mirrored
the actual strategy employed by Japan to a remarkable degree and demonstrates the abilities of
the students at the Army War College.315 While U.S. war planners’ prediction of enemy strategy
was the result of great foresight, their accurate forecast of U.S. strategy was no coincidence.316
Under the 1939 War Plan Purple scenario, students found Brazil in the midst of a civil
war between pro-Axis fascist rebels and the pro-U.S. government. The U.S. intervened to help
stabilize the government of Brazil under the auspices of the Monroe Doctrine, sending a corps
size expeditionary force to Brazil while the U.S. Navy interdicted rebel supplies at sea. U.S. war
planners noted that if more immediate trouble requiring the assistance of the U.S. Navy arose
elsewhere, the corps sent to Brazil might be temporarily abandoned. Clear from a reading of the
plans is the fact that a civil war in Brazil was not considered to be as high a priority as an actual
invasion of Brazil by the Axis powers or a Japanese advance in the Pacific. The most interesting
occurrence in 1939 at the Army War College may not have been the scenario developed there,
but Brigadier General George V. Strong’s mention of “a so-called Rainbow Plan, which is now
being drafted” in his annual lecture.317 Though the students may have been hearing of the
Rainbow Plans for the first time from Strong’s mouth, Strong and his fellow associates at the
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War Department knew that what the students had been working on since 1934 would be of great
assistance to their efforts.318
By the end of the academic year 1940, Nazi Germany had already invaded Poland,
Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and was rapidly conquering France. The British
evacuated the continent at Dunkirk and were all alone against the Axis Powers. As such the
course material at the Army War College reflected the deteriorating conditions in world affairs.
Mobilization was again at the top of the list of priorities as it was in 1938 and 1939, but a study
of Puerto Rico was added to the list of overseas territories to be examined for potential defensive
operations.319 Another new addition to the Army War College was the participation of Four
Foreign Service officers sent by the State Department to enroll in the intelligence portion of the
class.320 The last single color plan studied by the last AWC class prior to American involvement
in the Second World War was Orange, and the 1940 version was almost identical to the 1939
scenario. A step-by-step advance across the Pacific was already agreed upon by war planners.
After concentrating U.S. forces in Hawaii, the U.S. fleet would move on the Japanese
mandated islands, the Marshall, the Mariana, and the Caroline Islands. As U.S. forces advanced,
friendly bases would be established at the rear of the advance. Air power also factored into the
1940 scenario, with aircraft supporting the fleet’s advance from the newly established U.S. bases
as well as from carriers in the fleet. Since U.S. war planners suspected that the Japanese had been
building air bases on its mandated islands illegally, the planners wished to adapt these bases for
American use.321 The U.S. war planners also included fallback positions should they encounter
heavier than expected resistance. If this were encountered, the U.S. fleet would simply regroup
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and continue the advance. Since war planners believed that time was on their side, there was no
point in taking unnecessary risks early in the war. The object of the advance would be to liberate
Guam and the Philippines from Japanese control, and then to establish and constrict a blockade
around Japan, cutting off that resource poor nation from its sources of supply. War planners
hoped that an invasion of the Japanese home islands would not be necessary.322
Another group at the AWC had been tapped by the General Staff to work on a war plan
called Rainbow X, which proposed the scenario of a German-dominated Europe.323 The General
Staff and, in particular, the War Plans division of the War Department was almost taxed beyond
its limits in terms manpower and workload; therefore, the General Staff made the decision to
include the Army War College in the actual preliminary war planning of the War Department.324
In the Rainbow X scenario, the West European colonies in the Far East turned the European
conflict into a global war involving the Western Allies in a war with the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo
Axis Powers. In Europe, the scenario presumed a German-dominated Europe and war planners
responded accordingly. The strategy the group developed to deal with Nazi Germany forecast the
eventual allied strategy to a remarkable degree. 325
U.S war planners sought to apply pressure on a Nazi-dominated European continent by
“creating additional theaters on the German flanks, so as to disperse German effort and force the
expenditure of resources and reserve supplies.”326 The Allied invasion of Italy in 1943 comes to
mind with the previous statement.327 Also, while pressuring Germany’s flanks, war planners
sought to bring about the “economic strangulation” of the European Axis Powers.328 The
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effectiveness of the blockade against Germany during the First World War no doubt contributed
to the thought process of U.S. war planners. The point was clear; Germany had to be isolated and
cut off from resources.329 War planners stated that the “Allies will avoid decisive military
operations until Germany becomes over-extended or weakened, at which time they will strike a
coordinated blow in a decisive direction.”330 The Allied invasion at Normandy was a
“coordinated blow in a decisive direction” just at a time when Nazi forces had overextended
themselves in Italy, but more importantly on the Eastern Front.331 The group strategy concluded
very succinctly that “It is intended that all Allied measures will be continued until the Germany
Army is defeated, the country occupied, and the people subjugated.”332
The focus of the war effort, however, was very clear, as war planners stated the “Allied
attitude in the Pacific will be purely defensive, based on a strategy of first concentrating every
effort toward the defeat of Germany.”333 On the eve of American participation, the Allied
strategy of Germany first had definitively been set in stone. Although a Europe-first strategy had
existed since the early days of U.S. contingency war planning, much of the work conducted by
the students at the Army War College was original, and practically all of the work done there
was useful. As Gole asserted in The Road to Rainbow “The completed plans of 1938 and 1939 at
the War College became the Rainbow 4 plan approved by the Joint Board on 7 June 1940 and by
the President on 14 August 1940.”334 It is not unreasonable to assume, therefore, that the work of
student’s at the AWC under the 1938 “Orange and Purple” scenarios became the basis of the
other hemispheric defense plan, Rainbow 1, which was written by the Joint Board and approved
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by President Roosevelt in 1939. The final work of AWC students before the war in 1940 no
doubt laid the basis for both the Pacific and European strategies implemented by the United
States in World War II, and was part of long, continuous evolution of the Rainbow plans.
In May 1939 the Joint Board issued the directive to the Joint Planning Committee which
would later lead to the drafting of the famous Rainbow Plans.335 The Joint Board’s directive
asked the JPC to consider the relations of the United States with the various democratic powers
and their enemies, but also stated that “it will be assumed that action by the United States will be
unsupported and that the Democratic Powers of Europe as well as the Latin American States are
neutral; that should be sought from allied or neutral Democratic Powers with respect to specific
Theaters of Operation to render our efforts fully effective; and moreover will provide for the
alternative situations that would develop if the United States should support or be supported by
one or more of the Democratic Powers.”(original emphasis added) Furthermore, the Joint Board
officially requested that the Joint Planning Committee develop specific war plans to deal with
potential scenarios that might be encountered by a neutral United States prior to a world war.
The Joint Board explained that “In order that [the] Joint Rainbow Plans prepared in accordance
with the directive may provide an effective guide for the measures that would be required upon
the arising of the contemplated emergency, it is necessary that the prospective situation be
concretely visualized;” therefore, the threat posed to the United States must be clearly defined.336
The Joint Board’s directive, however, warned that if this is were not done, it would be
impossible to estimate the exact forces required for the execution of the plans. In essence, in
order to be successful, the Rainbow Plans had to give accurate estimates of allied and enemy
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strength under each scenario and had to be able to adapt to the different scenarios.337 To this end
the Joint Board wanted military planners to devise a scenario for a war which included “England,
France, and the United States on one side (possibly Russia also), and Germany, Italy, and Japan
(possibly Spain also) on the other side.”338 The Joint Board reasoned that with Britain and France
as allies the United States naval effort in the Atlantic would be significantly less than if were
acting alone. From the U.S. perspective, estimates of Allied strength were needed to determine
the U.S. forces required for a successful outcome. The Joint Board noted that the existence of the
aforementioned alliance against Japan would add English, French and United States possessions
in the Pacific to list of targets for Japanese expansion.339
The Joint Board proposed the following scenarios for the Joint Planning Committee to
consider. The first scenario proposed by the Joint Board was the standard scenario of the United
States versus Germany, Italy, and Japan. The United States objective in this scenario, however,
would be confined to the defense of the area of the Western Hemisphere north of 10 degrees
South Latitude, essentially north of the bulge of Brazil. Another scenario was the United States
versus Germany, Italy, and Japan with the focus of the United States armed effort in the Western
Hemisphere restricted to north of 10 degrees South Latitude, as well as to vital United States
interests in the Western Pacific. The third scenario was the United States versus Germany, Italy,
and Japan, with the objective of defending the entire Western Hemisphere. The fourth scenario
had the United States, England, and France versus Germany, Italy, and Japan, with the United
States providing maximum participation to Allied armies in Europe. The fifth scenario was the
United States, England, and France versus Germany, Italy, and Japan, with the United States not
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providing maximum participation in continental Europe, but maintaining the Monroe Doctrine
and carrying out allied tasks in the Pacific. Each Rainbow Plan would be based on one of the five
scenarios presented to the Joint Board in this document.340
The Rainbow Plans anticipated a global war in which the United States would participate
with one or more allies against one or more enemies. The general situation described in each of
the plans was that “a European War is in progress, which may involve other nations and expand
the field of military action. There is an ever present possibility of the United States being drawn
into this war. There is also the possibility that peace in Europe may be followed by a situation in
which the United States will be forced to defend, without allies, the integrity of the Monroe
Doctrine and her interests in the Pacific.”341 War planners were very well versed in the United
States responsibilities under the Monroe Doctrine, and defense of that policy would become a
key feature of many of the Rainbow Plans. The five different scenarios were then submitted by
the Joint Planning Committee for the consideration of the Joint Board and each one of these
scenarios called for the forces under the circumstances outlined before. The report asked
planners to draft a strategy to deal with these five contingencies. The general situation of each
scenario and the plan to be pursued in response to those situations were detailed by the JPC.342
Rainbow Plans 1, 2, 3, and 4 had been devised for the same general situation. The
situation described “Germany, Italy, and Japan, acting in concert, violate the letter or spirit of the
Monroe Doctrine. Japan, supported by Germany and Italy, violates by armed aggression vital
interests of the United States in the Western Pacific. It is to be assumed that aggression initiated
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by one or two of these powers will be eventually supported by the concerted action of all three.”
The general situation also carried some assumptions about the disposition of the democratic
allies stating that the United States will not be materially supported by Great Britain and France
and that Latin American States would remain neutral, but that in each plan the United States
would seek cooperation from allied or neutral powers. War planners also would provide for
alternative situations which may develop if the United States should support or be supported by
one or more of the Allied powers. Also a consideration of the joint Rainbow Plans was to
redefine the Western Hemisphere to include the Hawaiian Islands, Wake Island, American
Samoa and the Atlantic as far as the 30th Meridian of West Longitude.343
The special situation described by Rainbow One was “The termination of the war in
Europe is followed by a violation of the letter or the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine in South
America by Germany and Italy. This is coupled by an act of armed aggression by Japan in the
Far East. Other nations are neutral.”
The Joint Planning Committee stated that the purpose of Rainbow One was:
“To provide for the most effective use of naval and military forces to defeat enemy objectives,
particularly those in the territory and waters of the Western Hemisphere north of approximate
latitude thirteen degrees South. This plan will restrict initially the projection of U.S. Army forces
to the American continents and their outlying islands, north of 13 degrees South Latitude, and to
United States possessions in the Pacific westward to include UNALASKA and MIDWAY. This
plan will visualize the subsequent extension of United States control into the Western Pacific as
rapidly as possible consistent with the accomplishment of United States’ objectives in the
Western Hemisphere, but no plan for such extension of operations will be prepared at this time
(circa April 1940).”
The task of the U.S. Army and Navy during Rainbow One was to prevent the violation of
the Monroe Doctrine by protecting territory of the Western Hemisphere from which the interests
of the United States might be threatened, while protecting the continental United States, U.S.
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possessions and trade but would not provide for operations by U.S. military forces outside of the
previously defined area; therefore, Rainbow One was essentially a Hemispheric defense plan.344
Other key assumptions in Rainbow One were that Brazil and Peru would remain neutral
but that each country had a powerful political faction which favors the spread of fascism, Also,
war planners expected Mexico would be unfriendly to both the United States and the Fascist
powers while the other Latin American States, north of 10 degrees South Latitude, are neutral
but sympathetic to the United States. Rainbow One also assumed that England and France, while
initially neutral, as a matter of policy are also sympathetic to the United States. This sympathy
was because successful aggression by Germany, Italy, and Japan was unwelcome to these two
countries. War planners also predicted that the war would be preceded by a period of tense
relations which may develop into actual hostilities without a formal declaration of war.345
Under Rainbow One the primary mission of the United States Army and Navy was the
defense of Panama, the Caribbean Area, the northern part of South America, the continental
United States and Hawaii 346 and would involve immediate naval action to cut off all enemy
communications to the Western Hemisphere under the umbrella of U.S. defense.347 Also, the
plan noted that expeditionary forces would be organized to prevent the establishment of hostile
forces in areas which may threaten U.S. interests or to overcome any hostile forces which have
already managed to become established in those areas.348 Also, U.S. forces were to carry out
attacks on enemy shipping, vulnerable possessions, and exposed enemy forces, while also
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protecting U.S. shipping and possessions in order to “bring about peace conditions to the
advantage of the United States…”349 This general outline was followed by specific detailed plans
on how to achieve these objectives. The plan noted, however, that these operations may be
restricted because of the limited number of U.S. forces initially available at the time of the
apparent emergency.350 In essence, U.S. forces had to temporarily make do with what they had.
Another section of the Rainbow One plan discussed the “Cooperation that should be
sought from Allied or Neutral Democratic Powers”. Planners made it clear that Rainbow One
was designed to be a defensive plan for the security and integrity of the United States itself and
that the U.S. alone was responsible for carrying out the plan. U.S. war planners expected that any
assistance asked of their European or Latin American allies would probably be met with requests
for U.S. assistance in areas of interest to those allies; and therefore, U.S. war planners did not
want to count on any armed Allied assistance in carrying out Rainbow One. The only assistance
the United States sought from those countries was cooperation in the use certain facilities or the
permission to occupy certain strategic areas. The use of military bases located in Northern Brazil
and permission to use the Galapagos Islands of Ecuador and the Cocos Islands of Costa Rica
specifically topped the list of war planner’s requests. War planners also stated that Rainbow One
was planned with the expectation that this permission would be forthcoming by Brazil, Ecuador,
and Costa Rica. It was not stated, however, what course of action would be taken by the United
States if permission were not granted. Given their importance to U.S. war planners, they most
likely would have been acquired with or without permission.351
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The joint tasks of the Army and Navy under Rainbow One Plan were to deny Germany
and Italy communication with that part of the Western Hemisphere North of latitude 10 degrees
South and with other any part of the Western Hemisphere from which enemy forces could be
moved into that area.352 Also their joint task was to occupy necessary positions in the Natal area
to deny their use to enemy forces or enemy sympathizers in order to prevent the establishment of
potential sea, land or air bases in northeastern Brazil, and to secure the use of such bases for U.S.
forces.353 Ultimately the mission of both branches of the armed forces under Rainbow One was
to defeat and expel any enemy forces, or forces supporting the enemy, in the Western
Hemisphere North of 10 degrees South latitude, which in strength sufficient enough could
threaten the vital interests of the United States.354 Thus, the main objective of the United States
military under Rainbow One was to prevent the establishment of a Fascist bridgehead anywhere
in the Western Hemisphere, whether by preempting or repelling an invasion or by crushing a
fascist revolution.
Concerning Japan, U.S. war planners wished to disrupt its communications with the same
part of the Western Hemisphere.355 In regard to the Caribbean area the joint task of the Army and
Navy was to defend the Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and to support the U.S. naval forces
controlling the Caribbean Sea and conduct operations against any “shore objectives.”356 Another
objective of U.S. forces under Rainbow One was to hold the Panama Canal and to maintain its
continuous operation as well as to control and protect shipping in the coastal zone adjacent to the
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canal.357 In the Pacific the joint task of the Army and Navy was to hold Hawaii for naval use and
to control and protect shipping in its coastal zone.358 Another task of the armed forces under
Rainbow One was to defend Alaska and Alaskan waters and to control and protect shipping in its
coastal zone.359 Regarding the Philippines the joint task was to hold Manila Bay in order to deny
it to enemy naval forces. Thus, hemispheric defense was the prime consideration of war planners
when it came to Japanese as well as German aggression. It should be remembered though, that
the Western Hemisphere was defined as covering not only the Western Atlantic but also most of
the Eastern Pacific including Hawaii. U.S. forces in the Philippines, as usual, were on their own,
but war planners hoped that the Navy might be able to carry out a delaying action there.360
In summary, the Rainbow One war plan, which followed the 1938 strategic study
presumed a scenario in which the Monroe Doctrine was violated by one or more of the Axis
powers, while the British and the French remained neutral; therefore, it dealt primarily with
hemispheric defense and outlined a U.S. response to any foreign aggression in the Americas. The
scope of the U.S. defense perimeter was the Western Hemisphere north of the bulge of Brazil but
also included the defense of Greenland, Hawaii, Wake Island, Midway, and America Samoa.
U.S. planners excluded the Philippines and Guam from the defense perimeter, leaving their
garrisons to hold out while the United States mobilized and raised a sufficient naval and army
expeditionary force to relieve or rescue them. During this phase of the plan the U.S. would seek
to dominate the Western Atlantic and the Eastern Pacific until land forces could be deployed
overseas. At the same time the State Department would attempt to secure the cooperation of the
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various nations of the Western Hemisphere.361 After the Fall of France in June 1940, the U.S.
Navy threw together a naval support plan for Rainbow One, which called for amassing most of
the U.S. fleet off the northern coast of South America.362 Once hemispheric defense was secured,
however, war planners noted that a “subsequent extension of United States control into the
Western Pacific as rapidly as possible…” would occur.363
The special situation described by the Join Planning Committee for the Rainbow Two
war plan presumed that a “European War is in progress with Great Britain and France opposed to
Germany. Italy and Russia, [entering] into the war as allies to Germany may be expected.” The
British and the French still exercise effective control of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and their
continued control of them appears stable. The Japanese, who are supported by the Germans and
Italians, initiate aggressive action against the Far Eastern possessions of the United States, Great
Britain, France, and Holland, forcing these countries to join in concerted action in defense of
their various interests.364 The plan also notes that the United States would undertake, as its major
contribution to the conflict, to operate in concert with the Allied powers in the defeat of Japanese
aggression.365 Rainbow Two also presumed that Great Britain and France would be able to keep
Germany in check in Europe without U.S assistance; therefore, the United States would take it
upon itself to be the protector of Western interests in the Pacific and East Asia.
The Rainbow Two war plan, like Rainbow One, came with its own set of assumptions.
The first assumption was that the coalition of “Totalitarian Powers to which the United States
and her associates are opposed in a RAINBOW NO. 2 War, consist of Germany, Italy, and
361
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Japan.” 366 While initially Italy is not a belligerent, Italian forces are poised to threaten Allied
lines of communication in the Mediterranean.”367 The plan also states that the Russians are
initially neutral as well.368 However, the plan also notes that the possible entry of Russia into
coalition with Germany, Italy, and Japan, and participation in the war by Russia and Italy “may
intensify but will not change the character of the operations of the Totalitarian Powers in the Far
East.” At this time the plan states “an agreement among the Democracies… has been reached;”
therefore, a de facto alliance, at this point, has been established by the Western Powers.369
Rainbow Two presumed that Japanese aggression in the Pacific was underway and that
“Hong Kong and the International Concessions in China have been seized by Japan giving Japan
control of the entire coast of China.”370 Also, the war plan states that the undeclared war between
Japan and China continues, so Japan is forced to retain strong forces in China.371 Also, regarding
Russo-Japanese relations the plan notes that “relations between Japan and Russia will not permit
Japan to release her forces on the Siberian frontier of Manchukuo or in Mongolia.”372 Relating
the specifics of the Japanese advance south, the plan mentioned that Dutch oil ports in Northern
Borneo have been occupied by Japan373 and the various Japanese possessions in the Marshall,
Marianas and Caroline Islands have been fortified and are well defended. Essentially, a Japanese
defensive perimeter has been established, albeit with great forces committed to sustaining a
Japanese presence in Asia and the Western Pacific.374
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Of special interest to U.S. military operations in the Pacific it was assumed that before
United States forces reached the Far East it is possible that both the “Camranh and Binkhoi Bays
have fallen to Japan…”375, and that Japan has occupied Guam, Luzon, the ports of British and
Dutch Borneo “north of the northern entrance to the Strait of Makassar, on the Celebes Sea.”376
The Rainbow Two plan also presumed that Japan would have control of the waters around the
Philippines, the Celebes Sea, and the China Sea between the Philippines and the China coast “as
far south as Camranh Bay”377 and that “there have been considerable losses to both the naval
forces of Japan and of the Far Eastern forces of the Democracies.”378 From this description Japan
would clearly enjoy initial naval supremacy in the Western Pacific. The key assumptions of this
scenario were followed by a series of calculations regarding allied forces and operations.
U.S. war planners believed that “the naval forces of Great Britain and France may be
relied upon to protect our seaborne commerce, except in the Pacific, in the Caribbean Sea, and in
the Coastal Zones established by the United States, against the naval forces of the Totalitarian
Powers, thus freeing the bulk of our naval forces for operations in the Pacific.”379 War planners
expected to take great advantage of the cooperation to be rendered by the land, sea and air forces
of Great Britain, France and the Netherlands.380 The Rainbow Two scenario also anticipated that
U.S. coastal frontiers and lines of communications to Hawaii would be subject to submarine and
surface attacks.381 Operations in the Pacific would be “maritime in character,” using the bases
garrisoned by the Allied powers and additional bases garrisoned by U.S. forces. From this
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description, it is clear that U.S. planners did not believe that all of the Dutch East Indies would
fall under Japanese control before the United States could arrive in East Asia in full force. There
at the Malay or East Indies barrier, U.S. war planners hoped to hold Japan, this was a common
feature of War Plan Orange.382
Planners added that U.S. naval forces would be accompanied by Army forces for the
defense of bases and strategic points and would move promptly into the East Indies Area via a
Trans-Pacific route.383 They also stated that U.S. forces in the Pacific would be supported by
supplies in East Asia and by shipment from the United States via the Atlantic – Indian Ocean
route.384 War planners also anticipated the cooperation of China in increasing “military and
economic pressure on Japan in exchange for war materials”385 from the United States. The
immediate goal of U.S. forces in the Pacific was “to prevent the further advance of Japanese
forces into the East Indies area and to interfere with Japanese trade, particularly the shipment of
oil from the Dutch oil ports seized by Japan.”386 War planners predicted that over time, as U.S.
strength increased with Army and Navy reinforcements, more effective pressure could be applied
on Japan by ejecting Japanese forces from seized territories.387 Planners also hoped that allied
operations would eventually result in the evacuation of Hong Kong, the Philippines and Guam
by Japanese forces and would be restored to their rightful owners “by the terms of the peace”
which would follow.388 The Rainbow Two plan then described U.S. war planner’s prerequisite
conditions for a coalition between the United States, Great Britain, France and the Netherlands.
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Among the terms listed by war planners was the agreement of Great Britain to commit
“at least three battleships, prior to the arrival in strength of United States Naval Forces in the
East Indies area.”389 Also, there was the demand that “Great Britain, France and the Netherlands
agree to undertake the timely and coordinated employment of the sufficient naval, air and land
forces in the Far East…” in order to supply the U.S. Fleet with secure naval bases in Singapore,
Surabaya and the other parts of the Dutch and British East Indies, Australia, and the British and
French possessions in the South Pacific. Also, planners wanted the Allies to undertake measures
to delay the Japanese advance against Luzon, Camranh Bay and Binkhoi Bay and to maintain a
very effective surveillance of Japanese operations in the area.390 There were also the additional
demands that Great Britain and France provide and protect suitable refueling bases391 as well as
the expectation that “upon the arrival of the United States Fleet in the East Indies areas, the
efforts of the Associated Powers” in the Pacific the command of “all naval, land and air forces of
the Associated Powers” would be vested solely in the Commander in Chief of the United States
Fleet.392 War planners also requested that Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands “employ all
practicable economic measures against Japan”393 and support the efforts of the United States in
the Pacific “until the Philippines are recovered.”394
For its part the United States would agree to apply adequate strength to eject all Japanese
forces from the Dutch East Indies, and from any positions threatening the security of Singapore;
as well as to protect the “shipping of the Associated Powers in the Pacific and the Caribbean Sea;
and, in addition, to continue to apply sufficient pressure on Japan to compel her to agree to the
389
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surrender of Hong Kong and to insure to all members of the coalition adequate in equal rights in
China.”395 U.S. war planners also stated their assumption that China would still be engaged in
war with Japan and that this “is a matter of great importance” to the effectiveness of Rainbow
Two. For this reason, upon the “initiation of a RAINBOW NO. 2 War, negotiations with the
“Free” Government of China should be undertaken by the Associated Powers, for the purpose of
inducing the Chinese to increase their efforts to expel Japanese forces from Chinese territory, to
boycott Japanese goods and to stop exports to Japan.”396 Also, an agreement would be reached
between the United States and the other powers to provide an adequate supply of war materials
to China,397 on the condition that continued military action by China against Japan398 would be
forthcoming; therefore, the importance of China to U.S. interests is clear from these stipulations,
as is war planner’s distrust of the United States potential allies’ intentions.
Like Rainbow One, the Rainbow Two war plan also laid down joint tasks for the U.S.
Army and Navy to accomplish. The joint mission of the U.S. military was primarily to insure the
security of the continental United States, its overseas possessions, and seaborne trade in the
Pacific, and to defeat, “in concert with Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands, Japanese
aggression in the Pacific,”399 The task of U.S. military forces in the Pacific were to establish U.S.
forces in,400 to exercise control of,401 and to expel Japanese forces from the East Indies Area.402
Here, the Rainbow Two plan laid out the various phases of the initial conflict with Japan and
directly establishes the main objectives of each stage of the Allied response.
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In summary, Rainbow Two presumed that Great Britain and France were already at war
with Germany and able to maintain control over the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The Japanese,
wishing to take advantage of the situation, would attempt to conquer British, French, Dutch, and
possibly American possessions in the Pacific. The United States would then join into a coalition
with those nations in order to drive the Japanese back from the Southeast Pacific. War planners
drafted Rainbow Two to protect “vital U.S. interests in the Orient” by “securing control of the
Western Pacific, as rapidly as possible.”403 This scenario had the United States focus all of its
military might in the Asia-Pacific region in order to halt the Japanese advance near modern-day
Malaysia, followed by the recapturing of American and Allied territory from Japanese forces.
Finally, a U.S. blockade of Japan, would be implemented once Japanese forces were pushed back
to the Home Islands. Under Rainbow Two, the United States would carry the bulk of the Allied
operations in the Pacific, while the British and French would carry the bulk of Allied operations
in Europe. After the Fall of France in 1940, however, Rainbow Two became irrelevant.404
Rainbow Three, which would be the last plan to direct the main U.S. war effort against
Japan, was going to be a Pacific-oriented war plan like its predecessor Rainbow Two. Although
it was never officially written,405 Rainbow Three would have contained many elements similar to
the Rainbow Two plan. In fact, the main difference between Rainbow Two and Rainbow Three
was that in the former, the United States counted on at least some support from its allies in the
Pacific, while in the latter; the United States did not count on any help whatsoever. The main
goal, however, was the same; deprive Japan of the oil of the Dutch East Indies. According to
historian Edward Miller, the Rainbow Three plan was neither a daring thrust like Rainbow Two,
nor a prudent crawl like the classic Orange plans, but rather, a combination of the worst elements
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of both.406 Rainbow Three was a best case scenario for a bad situation. Anticipating the fall of
the Philippines and Guam, planners hoped for a miraculous Allied delaying action to halt the
Japanese advance around the Malay barrier, doing so with marginal forces until a sufficient relief
force could be raised. The War Plans Division (OP-12) attempted to remedy the defects inherent
in Rainbow Three by creating a stopgap measure to rush reinforcements to the Malay barrier in a
steady stream over time. However noble this attempt may have been, as Miller points out in his
book War Plan Orange, it was a reckless plan which violated common military sense; therefore,
in the end, nothing could save Rainbow Three.407
Concluded in 1940, Rainbow Four presumed that Great Britain and France had already
been defeated by Germany and Italy, while Japan stood ready to strike in the Pacific. It was also
assumed that the Axis Powers would acquire the use of one or both of the British and French
fleets, thereby giving the Axis naval supremacy in the Atlantic and thus posing a threat to the
Western Hemisphere and the Monroe Doctrine. The mission of the U.S. military under Rainbow
Four was to defend the Western Hemisphere as defined by U.S. war planners from Greenland to
Wake Island against German, Italian, and possibly Japanese aggression. The start date for
American mobilization according to planners could be no later than the date of the loss of the
British and French fleets to Axis Control. Initially, American and Canadian forces would occupy
Newfoundland (which was not yet a part of Canada) and Greenland (which belonged to
Denmark), while U.S. forces took control of British, French and Dutch possessions in the
Caribbean and South America, similar to versions of War Plan Black and War Plan Red.408
U.S. forces would also establish bases in northeastern Brazil, while Argentina, with U.S.
support, would assume sovereignty over the British Falkland Islands and also provide for their
406
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defense. In the Pacific, U.S. forces would occupy the Gilberts island group as well as Western
Samoa, while an expeditionary force prepared to move against any Axis threat posed to South
America. Rainbow Four would have required a massive mobilization of U.S. forces because it
called for a simultaneous offensive against both Germany and Japan without major allies. Within
six months of mobilization the Joint Board had hoped to have at least ten divisions under arms,
an unlikely feat even for U.S. capabilities.409 While Rainbow Four gave the U.S. Army an active
role in the defense of the Western Hemisphere, unlike the Pacific oriented Rainbow Two and
Rainbow Three plans, its defensive approach was out of keeping with national tradition and was
anathema to the naval doctrine of keeping potential threats at a distance, for these reasons it was
discarded by war planners in mid-1941 along with the other defensive plan, Rainbow One.410
An interesting feature of Rainbow Four was the emphasis of war planners on two critical
potential dates. The first of these two important dates was the anticipated loss of the British and
French fleets to the Axis Powers. The other date was six months after the surrender of the Allied
fleets to Germany and Italy. If the British and French Navy’s were simply destroyed, the second
date would not matter, but such an outcome was highly unlikely. In the event that both Britain
and France were defeated and their navies were surrendered, the date of their surrender would
coincide with M-Day (Mobilization Day) in the United States. U.S. war planners hoped that six
months after their initial mobilization, that U.S. forces would be ready to implement Rainbow
Four if the developing situation called for it. If standing U.S. forces were not ready after six
months, they would be supplemented with units from the National Guard.411
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Rainbow Four envisioned a scenario similar to that of Rainbow One. U.S. war planners,
however, expanded the field of potential operations to include the entire Western Hemisphere.
The special situation of Rainbow Four anticipated the “termination of the war in Europe” which
would be “followed by a violation of the letter or spirit of the Monroe Doctrine in South America
by Germany and Italy. This was coupled with armed aggression by Japan against United States
interests in the Far East. Other nations are neutral.” The purpose of Rainbow Four was simply to
“provide for the most effective use of United States Naval and military forces to defeat enemy
aggression occurring anywhere in the territory and waters of the American Continents, or in the
Eastern Atlantic,” in strength sufficient to threaten U.S. interests and possessions in the Pacific
including Unalaska and Midway.412
The scenario that war planners envisioned in Rainbow Four was a veritable worst-case
scenario for the United States. In the scenario, the U.S. would stand alone against Germany, Italy
and Japan. The combined fleet of both Germany and Italy would have been augmented by naval
units taken from Great Britain or France making a potential Axis fleet equal to or superior to the
entire U.S. Fleet. Under this scenario, Germany and Italy would have declared their intention to
take over all British, French, Dutch and Danish colonial possessions and mandates, including
those in the Western Hemisphere. Nazi Germany would also have assumed sovereignty over
Iceland as Italy assumed sovereignty over the Mediterranean territories of Great Britain and
France, and both acquired portions of the West African Coast.413
Meanwhile, Japan declared the entire Far East to be within her sphere of influence, but it
still has significant forces tied down in China. The Soviet Union was neutral, but unfriendly to
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both the United States and Japan, and at the same time the Soviets hoped to exploit the situation
by extending her influence into British India and to foment communist activity in Mexico. In the
wake of Great Britain’s defeat, the British Dominions, Ireland and India may have declared their
independence from Great Britain. Canada remained technically at war with Germany and takes
over Newfoundland from Great Britain. Also, German and Italian immigrants in Latin America
agitated against the established governments in the region, whom at this point, with the exception
of Mexico, all stood ready to cooperate with the United States in opposing the extension of Axis
influence into the Americas. War planners expected that the United States could occupy the
various British, Dutch, French and Danish colonies in the Western Hemisphere without
encountering native resistance. Strained relations resulting from the new world situation
preceded hostilities which may have begun without formal a declaration of war.414
The “concept of war” established by U.S. war planners declared that hostilities with the
Axis Powers would be followed by a U.S. occupation of all British, French, Dutch and Danish
possessions in the Western Hemisphere claimed by Germany and Italy as the spoils of war from
the defeated Allies. The war would have initially been an air and naval war as U.S. forces would
attempt to cut the Axis Powers communications with the Western Hemisphere. This was seen as
a necessary prerequisite for U.S. occupation of British, French, Dutch and Danish possessions in
the Western Hemisphere and desired by planners to ensure total political control. The occupation
of these and other key strategic areas in Latin America required the use of expeditionary forces
to deny the Axis powers use of those territories; therefore, occupational or offensive actions may
have been required to insure the total integrity of the Monroe Doctrine, or to defeat any enemy
sympathizers within the Western Hemisphere which may have threatened to destabilize friendly
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governments. An American alliance with Canada to defend Newfoundland and Greenland and an
American alliance with Argentina to defend the Falkland Islands was also sought by the U.S.415
The security of Panama, the Caribbean, the continental United States, and Alaska
including the Aleutians, Hawaii, and Northeastern Brazil were the primary concerns emphasized
in Rainbow Four. The United States, it was assumed by war planners, would endeavor to adjust
disputes with Japan in order to forestall the entrance of that country into the conflict. When the
Japanese did enter the conflict, U.S. war planners anticipated that it would probably first seize
the Philippines and Guam, as well as launch submarine attacks and surface raids against U.S.
communications to Hawaii, Alaska and the Western Coast of Latin America. War planners also
anticipated that the financial and industrial resources of the United States would be devoted to
increasing at the maximum rate our relative strength particularly in naval, air and mechanized
forces. Organized sabotage, industrial strikes and other efforts to hinder this mobilization of
resources was expected. War planners also noted that as the U.S. relative strength increased, it
would gradually extend American control of the seas into the Western Pacific and the Eastern
Atlantic. Rainbow Four plan was also significant in that war planners hinted at United States
military operations in Western Africa.416
The joint mission of the U.S. Military under Rainbow Four was “insuring the security of
Continental UNITED STATES, ALASKA, OAHU, PANAMA, THE CARIBBEAN AREA, and
NORTHEASTERN BRAZIL, to prevent the violation of the letter or the spirit of the Monroe
Doctrine in all the territory of the WESTERN HEMISPHERE” and to “extend military pressure
to the WESTERN PACIFIC, the EASTERN ATLANTIC, and WESTERN AFRICA in order to

415

“Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan – Rainbow No.4,” 05/31/1940, National Archives, RG-225 M-1421, Roll
11 – 0139.
416
“Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan – Rainbow No.4,” 05/31/1940, National Archives, RG-225 M-1421, Roll
11 – 0139-0140.

111

defeat enemy aggression and enable the UNITED STATES to impose terms favorable to itself in
the eventual peace settlement.”417 The joint tasks of the U.S. Army and Navy under Rainbow
Four were to establish U.S. sovereignty over British, French, Dutch and Danish possessions in
the Western Hemisphere. These territories also included Greenland, Newfoundland, Bermuda,
the Bahamas, the Leeward Islands, the Windward Islands, Barbados, Trinidad, Tobago, British
Guiana, British Honduras, St. Pierre, Miquelon, La Guadeloupe, La Martinique, French Guiana,
Curacao, Aruba, and Suriname in the Atlantic, plus the Gilbert, Ellice, and Line Islands as well
as Western Samoa, Pitcairn and the Tuamotu Islands in the Pacific.418 Another task of Rainbow
Four was to insure the security of the Panama Canal and the Caribbean Area.419
Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy was to establish control over the Western Atlantic while the
U.S. Army and Marines insured the security of Northeastern Brazil and prevented a violation of
the Monroe Doctrine in all the American republics not included in the Caribbean theatre.420 Over
time the United States was to extend American control into the North Atlantic and to defend the
North Atlantic Coastal zone, which included Newfoundland, St. Pierre, Miquelon and Greenland.
Also, the United States was to control and protect all friendly shipping within this zone and to
extend U.S. military pressure into the Eastern Atlantic and Western Africa.421 The United States
was also to defend the Southern Coastal Frontier which included the Bahamas422 and Bermuda as
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an outlying U.S. naval base.423 In the Pacific, the U.S. Navy was to establish American control
over the Eastern Pacific 424 and to defend the Pacific Coastal zone, which included the Pacific
Coast of the United States and Alaska, including the Kodiak and Unalaska Islands, as well as to
control and protect shipping in this zone.425 A key goal in the Pacific was to hold Oahu Island as
a main outlying naval base and to protect shipping in the waters around the Hawaiian Islands.426
A more difficult goal in the Pacific was to hold the entrance to Manila Bay in order to deny it to
enemy naval forces, a nearly hopeless task which had long been doubted by war planners.427
After Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s reelection in 1940, Admiral Harold R. Stark, the Chief
of Naval Operations, submitted a paper calling for the creation of a specific war plan to provide
guidance for military mobilization efforts and to plan U.S. strategy, to the Secretary of the Navy,
William Franklin Knox. Stark assumed that the independence and survival of Great Britain and
the British Commonwealth was of vital importance to the security of the United States. Stark
further concluded that the British could not defeat the Axis powers alone and at the same time he
realized that Japan might enter the war at any moment on the side of Germany and Italy in order
to exploit Great Britain’s weakness.428 In response, Stark drafted four plans of action. Plan A
called for hemispheric defense but not immediate aid to British; Plan B called for an offensive
war against Japan, involving lengthy operations, but still provided no immediate aid to the
British; Plan C called for offensive operations against both Germany and Japan; and Plan D or
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Dog which called for Allied offensive operations in the Atlantic, including large-scale land
operations in either the North Africa or Europe or both regions, while at the same time the
United States would remain on the defensive in the Pacific until both Germany and Italy were
defeated. Plan D would be adopted nearly wholesale as the Joint Strategic Plan or the “National
Defense Policy of the United States” was commissioned by General George C. Marshall, and
reviewed by the Joint Board, and finally approved by President Roosevelt as Rainbow Five on
November 19, 1941.429
Like the other Rainbow plans, Rainbow Five came with a certain set of assumptions that
would guide U.S. war planners. The scenario under Rainbow Five placed the Associated Powers,
which consisted of the United States, the British Commonwealth of Nations (minus Ireland), the
Dutch East Indies, Russia, the various governments in exile abroad, China and “Free French”
forces on one side and Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and possibly
Japan, Indochina, and Thailand, on the other. Rainbow Five also assumed that U.S. forces in the
Far East would be supplied by friendly governments in the region, at least initially. War planners
also envisioned the full cooperation of the Latin American Republics minus perhaps Mexico.430
The eventual conduct of the war would follow the strategy laid down in the ABC-1 and ABC-22
plans drafted by the joint American-British-Canadian staff meetings.431 The ABC staff meetings
first stated the interests of each party involved in opposing Germany. The paramount interest of
the United States in the global conflict was essentially to maintain its territorial interests in the
Western Hemisphere and to prevent the extension of any European or Asiatic political or military
power there. The British interest in the conflict was the security of the United Kingdom and the
429
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British Commonwealth of Nations. An added interest of British war planners was the retention of
a position in the Far East that will ensure the cohesion and security of the Commonwealth and
the maintenance of the war effort of the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India, essentially,
the survival of the British Empire after the war.432
The strategic concept of Rainbow Five consisted of the application of naval, land, and air
forces as well as the use of diplomatic measures designed to increase economic pressure on the
Axis powers. The implementation of a sustained air offensive against Axis military targets and
economic centers were also discussed in Rainbow Five. The early elimination of Fascist Italy as
an active partner in the Axis was an objective of Rainbow Five. The plan also called for the
employment of the air, land, and naval forces of the Associated Powers in offensives at every
opportunity against Axis military strength. The support of different neutrals, the allies of the
United Kingdom, the associates of the United States, and the various resistance groups within
Axis occupied territory were mentioned. The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual
offensive against Germany and the capture of positions from which to launch the eventual Allied
offensive were outlined in Rainbow Five.433
Military operations of the Associated Powers were governed by the following principles
of conduct. Since Germany was the prominent member of the Axis, the European theatre was
considered by U.S. planners to be the decisive theater, and therefore, U.S. efforts would be
exerted primarily on that theater. Furthermore, all other Allied operations were expected by war
planners to facilitate success in that theater. Meanwhile, the principal task of the U.S. Navy
under Rainbow Five in the Atlantic Ocean was to protect the shipping of the Allied Powers,
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primarily in the northwestern approaches to the United Kingdom. Although the Mediterranean
theater was considered to be only of secondary importance, U.S. war planners still regarded the
retention of British and Allied positions in the Mediterranean to be of great importance to the
Allied war effort.434
In the Pacific, U.S. war planners stated that even if Japan did not initially enter the war on
the side of the Axis, it would still be necessary for the Allied powers to guard against probable
Japanese intervention. War planners noted that if Japan intervened, U.S. military strategy in the
Far East would initially be defensive in character. The goal of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific was
to harass Japanese trade and to support the defense of the “Malay Barrier” which included the
Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java and the chain of islands stretching east from Java to Bathurst
Island, Australia.435 Meanwhile, the principal defensive roles of the various Allied Powers was to
hold the British Isles against an invasion, to defend the Western Hemisphere, and to protect the
outlying military bases and islands that were of great strategic importance to the Allies and were
needed to guard against enemy land, air or sea-borne attack.
Under Rainbow Five, the United States would provide for the greatest share of the
defense of the Western Hemisphere. War planners also noted that under this scenario enemy
efforts would primarily be limited to raids by air and naval forces, while the buildup of large land
and air forces for use in major operations against the Axis Powers would be the primary
immediate effort of the Associated Powers.436 The areas of responsibility assigned to each side
were extremely detailed. The United Kingdom assumed responsibility of the air, maritime and
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land areas around the British Isles, Australia and New Zealand, as well as areas adjacent to
Spain, Portugal, Northwest Africa, Gibraltar, the South Atlantic, Mediterranean and Middle-East
Areas, India and the East Indies Areas. The United States military was given the responsibility of
commanding operations in the Far East and the Western Hemisphere minus the areas assigned to
Canada under the ABC-22 agreement which consisted of Newfoundland and adjacent islands.437
The joint tasks of the Army and Navy under Rainbow Five were to defeat the Axis
Powers and guard United States national interests by reducing Axis economic power to wage war
through blockade, raids, and sustained air offensives in cooperation with the other Allied Powers.
Also the Army and Navy would eventually seek to destroy Axis military power by raids and an
eventual land, naval, and air offensives. The Navy, assisted by the Army, was to protect the sea
communications of the Associated Powers, while both the Army and the Navy were to prevent
the extensions of European or Asiatic military power into the Western Hemisphere and to protect
outlying military base areas and islands of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne
attack. War planners noted that no Latin American forces were to be calculated into Allied
strength, but that such forces may reduce the U.S. forces required but would not alter the nature
of the joint tasks of the Army and Navy.438
Other joint tasks included inter-service assistance in the case of enemy attack in any of
the various coastal zones.439 War planners also urged diplomatic measures to secure U.S. access
to available sea, air, and land bases in Latin America as well as permission from Brazil to allow
U.S. forces to use Brazilian territory as a staging ground for an invasion of the African continent.
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The United States would also seek permission from the governments exercising sovereignty over
Ireland, the Azores, the Cape Verde and Canary Islands, French North Africa, French West
Africa and Curacao and Aruba Islands. The U.S. was also to provide diplomatic and economic
support to the Allied governments in exile, and resistance groups in Axis territory and China.440
Under this plan, the United States would have devoted most of its energies primarily to
an offensive strategy in Europe, considered “the decisive theatre” by planners, in order to defeat
“the predominant enemy” Germany.441 Rainbow Five also called for holding the Mediterranean
Front and knocking Italy out of the war, as well as for sustaining an air assault against Germany
as well as the eventual opening a land offensive in Europe. As the Atlantic fleet assisted the
Royal Navy, the Pacific fleet stood on guard in the Eastern Pacific.442 The role of the Pacific
Fleet under Rainbow Five was to shield the Eastern Pacific and its atoll bases, create diversions
for Japan, harass Japanese trade and prepare an assault on the Japanese mandated islands as far
as Truk. Although Rainbow Five’s Eurocentric focus once threatened to create a prolonged U.S.
defensive war in the Pacific, Rainbow Five’s limited war plan in the Pacific was abandoned in
favor of an aggressive version of War Plan Orange during World War II. As U.S. forces were
able to take to the offensive against Japan much earlier than expected,443 nearly an equal an
effort was expended there as in Europe from the war’s early stages.444 Overall, however, World
War II was conducted by the United States largely in accordance with Rainbow Five, the global
plan established in 1941, and it remained in effect until its rescission in March 1946.445
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CONCLUSION:
In conclusion, the necessity of America’s contingency war planning is apparent from a
review of the following considerations. As demonstrated in Chapter I, the number of situations
the United States committed itself to prevent as a result of the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine
made conflict with or within the countries of the Western Hemisphere all but inevitable. Whether
or not those interventions rested their justification on the Monroe Doctrine, as did President
Theodore Roosevelt or upon the United States rights as a sovereign nation in the interests of
national security, as did Undersecretary of State Joshua Reuben Clark, most American statesmen
believed that such interventions by the United States were justified for one reason or another.
Furthermore, the interventions anticipated by war planners occurred with remarkable frequency
after the turn of the 20th century and as those interventions increased, so did the drafting of war
plans. U.S. war planners showed their ability to adapt and learn from the mistakes of the U.S.
military history as well as its successes.
War Plan Tan was necessary on account of the protectorate the United States exercised
over Cuba. Several of these interventions occurred under the auspices of the Platt Amendment,
which both codified such actions by the United States into American and Cuban law, as well laid
out the criteria or intent of those military various interventions in the war plans themselves. War
Plan Gray, which had been drafted to deal with various contingencies in the Caribbean Sea and
Central American regions, were also vindicated in light of history and their practicality. The
same could be said about War Plan Green, given the historical instability of Mexico and the long
unfortified border the United States shared with that nation. War Plan Green also demonstrated
military planners’ acquaintance with U.S. military history, with the interventions in Mexico
resembling the campaigns of the U.S.-Mexican War. The abortive military actions undertaken
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during the Wilson administration indicated both the military’s commitment to the strategies of
the U.S.-Mexican War and their willingness to execute them. General Pershing’s Expedition into
Northern Mexico in pursuit of the rebel bandit Pancho Villa resembled in large degree Zachary
Taylor’s invasion of Northern Mexico, just as the occupation of Veracruz in 1914 foretold an
action similar to Winfield Scott’s invasion of Veracruz on his march to Mexico City.
War Plan Violet, which called for a large scale U.S. intervention in South America may
have been justified in light of history, but such an intervention never occurred because the vital
interests of the United States were never threatened. Interestingly enough, when a perceived
threat to South America was large enough to imperil the integrity of the Monroe Doctrine or
even security of the United States, U.S. war planners resurrected War Plan Violet as War Plan
Purple in the AWC war plans of the late 1930s and then included variations of Violet in Rainbow
One and Rainbow Four. War Plan Black against Germany was based on the presumption that
Germany had navy capable of projecting power across the Atlantic and called for a U.S. defense
of the Caribbean against German invasion. After Scapa Flow in 1919 where the German High
Seas Fleet had been scuttled, the threat of a German invasion of the Western Hemisphere made
the necessity of War Plan Black unlikely. However, if the British or French were defeated and as
a result had to surrender their fleets to Germany, augmenting German naval power, War Plan
Black most likely would have been resurrected. The spirit, if not the letter, of Plan Black can be
found in both Rainbow One and Rainbow Four
The growing power and influence of the United States as a result of American expansion
also necessitated contingency war planning, in particular, against other great powers. War Plan
Red against the British Empire made perfect sense in light of both the historical British policies
of attempting to block American expansion and maintain a balance of power in North America.
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Also, considering British policies against other nations in order to prevent any rivals to its
commercial and naval power, U.S. war planners were prudent in their drafting a contingency
plan against Great Britain. As demonstrated in Chapter II, Anglo-American relations were not
always cordial, even after World War I. In fact, U.S. authorities distrusted British intentions in
the Western Hemisphere as late as 1940. It was necessary to have a contingency plan to deal with
Great Britain if the British ever wished to contest Secretary of State Olney’s assertion that the
United States was supreme on the North American continent and that its word was law there.
War planners drew on the lessons of the previous American invasions of Canada during the
Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, with a number of the invasion routes paralleling those
failed operations. Planners obviously believed that the strategy was sound in those conflicts, but
that the economy of force used was not equal to the task.
War Plan Red-Orange against Great Britain and Japan was a logical reaction to the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance from 1902-1922. Coupling the United States’ historical continental foe
with their newly found foes in the Pacific was a difficult but necessary contingency at the time.
War Plan Orange against Japan made sense if the Japanese ever attempted to assert supremacy in
the Pacific. Given American control of the Philippines and Japanese control of Taiwan, having a
contingency against Japan was also logical. U.S. occupation of the Philippines also necessitated
War Plan Brown against a Philippine Insurrection. In light of the Philippine-American War such
a contingency was not only reasonable, it was necessary. The American presence in those islands
was an important link to the keystone of U.S. East Asian and specific policy, China. War Plan
Yellow against an anti-foreign rebellion in China was also necessary in light of the Boxer
Uprising of 1899-1901. After the Boxer Protocol of 1901, the U.S. commitment in China
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increased, as did the possibility of conflict due to the weakness of the Qing Dynasty and the
revolutionary and warlord periods which followed its fall in 1911.
The contributions of student war planners at the Army War College not only revised
some of these existing plans, but as demonstrated in Chapter III they also drafted new war plans
to deal with the increasing possibility in the 1930s of U.S. involvement in another global war.
Also, increasingly likely was the possibility of U.S. participation in coalition warfare. While the
very first contingency plan under the umbrella of coalition warfare dealt solely with a Pacific
War scenario, the remainder of the scenarios under “Participation with Allies” rubric dealt with
either preparations to meet the challenge posed by a two-ocean war or the actual conduct of a
two ocean strategy. From 1938 on, the “Participation with Allies” exercises resurrected War Plan
Violet as War Plan Purple and revised War Plan Orange into the version which would be
implemented during World War II. Also, the very strategy behind Allied victory in Europe
contained in Rainbow Five was born from the embryonic plan Rainbow X devised by student
war planners at the AWC in 1940. Due the hard work of these student planners, the United States
was able to meet almost any threat which it may have encountered at the outset of U.S.
involvement in another global war.
Although the War Plans Division at the War Department outsourced a variety of plans to
the AWC, the influence of these individual student war planners went far beyond being a mere
advisory council. Many of those who graduated from the AWC went on to participate directly in
war planning prior to and during the Second World War. When the United States entered the
global conflict in late 1941, 260 of 305 general officers were graduates of the AWC. A total of
436 graduates from the years 1934-1940 when “Participation with Allies” was a part of the
course study at the Army War College went on to become generals in World War II. More
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importantly were there contributions to the War Plans Divisions at the War Department. Four
graduates from the class of 1934, five graduates from the class of 1935, nine graduates from the
class of 1936, three graduates from the class of 1937, seven graduates of the class of 1938, eight
graduates from the class of 1939 and four graduates from the class of 1940 went on to work for
WPD after graduating from the Army War College. 127 graduates from these years received
high-level staff positions, and half of these received key General Staff appointments. At one
point five out of six brigadier generals and thirteen out of nineteen colonels served in General
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Operations Division.446
This thesis has attempted to demonstrate how pre-written war plans developed over the
course of the fifty years prior to World War II were at least useful in helping to draft new ones,
as military planners often stood on the shoulders of their predecessors. Also, one of the key
activities requisite to war planning, intelligence gathering, proved to be particularly useful to war
planners. Inherent in intelligence gathering is the acquisition of the knowledge of both a potential
enemy’s strengths and weaknesses. While having knowledge of a potential enemies’ strengths
and weaknesses is important, so too is having knowledge of allies’ strengths and weaknesses,
and thus their limits and capabilities. As the international situation developed, U.S. war planners
could easily shift the statistics of particular countries from the adversary to the allied column.
While the usefulness the war plans themselves may be questioned, it is important to remember
that contingencies deal with possibilities, not predictions. War planners must always live by the
motto Si vis pacem, para bellum (If you want peace, prepare for war) because they are in the
business of being prepared for anything.
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